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n , Con ress adopted the pportunity one, a powerful place based
economic development tool, as part of a ma or ta reform. Place based
economic development tools and strate ies provide incentives to re attract
obs and capital to areas from which obs and capital have fled. nvestors in
state desi nated pportunity one districts benefit from their mechanics
they are able to defer capital ains on ualified investments step up
ta basis on invested funds and permanently avoid ta on investment
appreciation. Proponents of the pportunity one ar ued that these ta
incentives will serve as an efficient way to direct investment dollars to poor
areas. However, critics point out that such overnment interventions are
stricken by corruption, abuse, and waste.
his Article analy es and criti ues the pportunity one. t ar ues that,
when compared to other place based economic development tools, the
pportunity one is an e tremely troublesome approach. hone my analysis
on three key dimensions use, transparency, and participation. Focusin on
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those dimensions, ar ue that the pportunity one may well harm the very
areas and individuals that it is supposed to benefit. When considerin its
potential to increase wealth and income ine uality in particular, there is
ample reason to be skeptical of the benefits of the pportunity one.
Place based approaches to economic development as such are not
necessarily to blame. Rather, it is the pportunity one itself, with its
propensity to benefit investors and e istin landowners at the e pense of
others, that needs reform. Accordin ly, e plore proposals to restructure the
pportunity one. hese proposals would limit the uses of invested funds,
improve transparency to assess meanin ful outcomes, and involve
stakeholder roups throu h participation.
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INTROD CTIONThe Tax Cuts and obs Act of 20171 included a potentially lucrative, yetscantly discussed, new economic development strategy. The OpportunityZone tool allows investors to allocate dollars to qualifying fund pro ects todefer and in some cases avoid paying tax on capital gains from investmentactivities.2 nsurprisingly, the Administration has touted the incentive,3claiming that $100 billion would pour into impoverished census tracts.4 A
1. Tax Cuts and obs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (as codifiedin scattered sections of the I.R.C.).2. I.R.C. 1400Z-2 (2018). For reporting on how investors are using theOpportunity Zone, see, for example, esse Drucker Eric Lipton,How a rump
a Break to Help Poor Communities Became aWindfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES(Aug. 31 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2019 08 31 business tax-opportunity- ones.html https: perma.cc H3WE-WL4 .3. The White House, Remarks by President Trump in the State of the nionAddress (Feb. 4, 2020), https: www.whitehouse.gov briefings-statementsremarks-president-trump-state-union-address-3 https: perma.cc YCG9-P79F ( obs and investments are pouring into 9,000 previously neglectedneighborhoods, thanks to opportunity ones . . . . ).4. See, e. ., uliaManchester,Mnuchin Predicts B in Cap nvestment from ew
pportunity ones, HILL (D.C.) (Sept. 28, 2018), https: thehill.com hilltvrising 408980-mnuchin-predicts-100b-in-cap-investment-from-new-opportunity- ones https: perma.cc 5 TG- A9C (quoting TreasurySecretary Mnuchin as saying I think there’s going to be over $100 billiondollars in private capital that will be invested in opportunity ones . . . . ).
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year after the law’s passage, reports of overwhelming investor interestappeared to support this bold claim.5 Nearly two years after the enactmentof the law, however, investments in Opportunity Zones have been far moremodest than anticipated.6 Even these modest investments have not had therobust impact that proponents had promised.7Place-based economic development strategies like the OpportunityZone are not new.8 In fact, place-based economic development strategiesemerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a market-based approach to solvingcomplex social and economic issues. The mechanics of these strategies canvary, but most adopt a tax incentive policy-based approach.9
5. One investment fund reported raising as much money for its certifiedOpportunity Fund in seventeen hours as it did in its eleven-year history. AlexNitkin, ri in pportunity Fund Raises M in Hours, Citin nsane
Amount f Demand, REAL DEAL (Nov. 20, 2018, 1:30 PM),https: therealdeal.com chicago 2018 11 20 origin-opportunity-fund-raises-105m-in-17-hours-citing-insane-amount-of-demandhttps: perma.cc R73M-DEHC see also Diane Lupke, pportunity ones A
Different one pportunity, 24 . M LTISTATE TA INCENTIVES 24, 44 (2019)( Early evidence suggests that the Opportunity Zone has potential to bringnew money to the table not heretofore invested in distressed communities isalready being reali ed. ).6. See Ruth Simon Peter Grant, pportunity one Funds Are ff to a Slow Start,
La in Behind Heady E pectations, WALL ST. . (Oct. 22, 2019, 7:00 AM ET),https: www.ws .com articles opportunity- one-funds-are-off-to-a-slow-start-lagging-behind-heady-expectations-11571742002 https: perma.ccM5PP-867V . As of September 2020, therewas $12.05 billion in equity raisedfrom voluntarily-reporting qualified opportunity funds. Opportunity ZonesResource Center, ovo radac pportunity Funds Listin s otals, NOVOGRADAC,https: www.novoco.com resource-centers opportunity- one-resource-center opportunity-funds-listing https: perma.cc 3N79-TMY6 .7. See Simon and Grant supra note 6.8. See infra Part I (describing place-based economic development tools leadingup to and including the Opportunity Zone). A neoliberal belief in freeenterprise as a goal unto itself has characteri ed place-based economicdevelopment policy since its inception in the 1980s. See TIMOTHY P.R.WEAVER,LAZING THE NEOLI ERAL TRAIL: R AN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NITEDSTATES AND THE NITED INGDOM 25-27 (2016) (previewing the political shiftsthat led to bipartisan support in the nited States for state enterprise onelaws).9. Michelle D. Layser has created a useful typology of place-based investment taxincentives. See Michelle D. Layser, A ypolo y of Place Based nvestment a
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Opportunity Zones are the most recent, and most hands-off, form offederal intervention into the economies of disadvantaged communities.Supporters of the Opportunity Zone suggest that these communities lackaccess to capital.10 They also suggest that investors, when presented withtax advantages, will deliver that missing capital.11 ased on this logic, some
ncentives, 25 WASH. LEE . C.R. SOC. ST. 403, 411-42 (2019). Researchsupports the assertion that using the tax code to further a policy goaldeveloping poor neighborhoods is more politically palatable because suchtax incentives obscure the si e of government spending. See, e. ., asonFichtner acob Feldman,When Are a E penditures Really Spendin A Look
at a E penditures and Lessons from the a Reform Act of , at 4(Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason niv., Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011),https: www.mercatus.org system files Tax expendituresFichtnerFeldman WP1145 0.pdf https: perma.cc A4F - 484 LaurenLambie-Hanson, Addressin the Prevalence of Real Estate nvestments in the
ew Markets a Credit Pro ram 7 (Fed. Reserve ank of S.F. Cmty. Dev. Inv.Ctr., Working Paper 2008-04, 2008), https: www.frbsf.org community-development files wp08-041.pdf https: perma.cc E4YG-AP . Yet, atthis moment of awareness about income inequality resulting from law andpolicy decisions promoting racial segregation, there are good reasons to beskeptical of the benefits of the place-based tax incentives. The Tax Foundationreports that place-based incentive programs (1) redistribute wealth, asopposed to generating new economic activity, (2) subsidi e development thatwould have occurred anyways, and (3) displace low-income residents byincreasing property values and attracting wealthier, higher-skilled workers.SCOTT EASTMAN NICOLE AEDING TA FO ND., FISCAL FACT NO. 630, OPPORT NITYZONES: WHAT WE NOW AND WHAT WE DON’T (2019)https: files.taxfoundation.org 20190107155914 Opportunity-Zones-What-We- now-and-What-We-Don E2 80 99t-FF-630.pdfhttps: perma.cc 78 -E5RS .10. See infra Section I.D see also Can pportunity ones Address Concerns in the
Small Business Economy Hearin Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 116thCong. 8 (2019) hereinafter pportunity ones Hearin s (statement of AaronSeybert, Managing Director of Social Investments, resge Foundation)(discussing how most Opportunity Zone fund managers have focused on realestate).11. Indeed, the broadly-stated goal of the Opportunity Zone, a program lobbiedfor by tech billionaire Sean Parker, is to bring capital to urban and rural areasthat need it. See, e. ., Steven ertoni, An nlikely Group of Billionaires and
Politicians Has Created the Most nbelievable a Break Ever, FOR ES ( uly 18,2018, 6:00 AM EDT), https: www.forbes.com sitesforbesdigitalcovers 2018 07 17 an-unlikely-group-of-billionaires-and-
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lawmakers are arguing for doubling-down on Opportunity Zones as aresponse to the economic decline caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.12However, as this Article argues, the success or failure of place-basedeconomic development strategies depends not ust on improving places, butalso improving the lives of people living in those places.13 Essentially,Opportunity Zones allow investors who sell a preexisting asset to place theproceeds of the sale into a new investment in a qualifying fund.14 Inexchange for this new qualifying fund investment, the investor receivesfavorable tax deferral on the gains from the sale of the asset.15 As a result,investors are rewarded financially for selling one asset and moving capitalinto a qualifying fund in a designated low-income community. utwhile thispolicy mechanism may benefit investors, it is in no way guaranteed tobenefit individuals living in low-income communities.Consider two different examples of how theOpportunity Zone incentivecould work for investors and communities. First, a best-case scenario:Suppose that, in 1978, a ansas-based contractor created a businessspeciali ing in metal construction used for aircraft hangers, commercialbuildings, and concrete slab foundations.16 Suppose further that, in 2019,the owner retired and sold the business to a purchaser for $10 million incash. This puts the seller into the highest federal income tax bracket,
politicians-has-created-the-most-unbelievable-tax-break-everf818a7b14855 https: perma.cc GP8L-7MND (discussing how a belief inbringing capital to poor communities, and a $1 million bet with billionairePeter Thiel, motivated Parker to push for the Opportunity Zone law).12. See COVID-19-Impacted Small usiness Opportunity Zone Act, H.R. 6529,116th Cong. (2020).13. See infra Section I.A (discussing the framework of community economicdevelopment ).14. See I.R.C. 1400Z-2(a) (2018).15. d. 1400Z-2(a)-(c), (e).16. The facts of this hypothetical are adapted from a business sale listing in Texasposted on a digital business purchase and sale platform. See e as Metal
Buildin Manufacturer, IZ EST, https: www.bi quest.com business-for-sale texas-metal-building-manufacturer W1671958q YTE9NTAwMDAwMSZsdHlwZT00MCZvPTEmYTI9OTk5OTk5OTk5 psn14 https: perma.cc 8PH8-S42 . In addition, the estimated financialreturns are adapted from ernhard Capital Partners’ model of OpportunityZone tax benefits. See ernhard Capital Partners, Financial Model (on file withthe author).
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currently 37 . Also, the sales pricewould be sub ect to federal capital gainstax of 20 , racking up a tax bill of $2 million.17The seller, hoping to avoid the $2 million capital gains tax, invested thefull $10 million into a ualified Opportunity Fund. The Fund, in turn,invested the $10 million into renovating a currently vacant building in adesignated neighborhood in Topeka to house a health clinic and commercialkitchen incubator on the ground floor, as well as apartments for mixed-income families above. As long as the building is not sold for ten years, andall other formal requirements aremet, assuming the building appreciates at12 a year,18 the seller will receive over $9.66million in present value frompermanently excluding capital gains, deferring capital gains, anddepreciation.19 This additional 9.65 per-year return generated by taxbenefits is on top of returns earned through rent, and the increased price ofthe building and underlying land.20In a city like Topeka, which is so hungry for new residents that it iswilling to pay, among providing other advantages, up to $15,000 to people
17. See I.R.C. 1 (2018). In ansas, capital gains are taxed as regular income at atop rate of 5.7 . See AN. STAT. 79-3276(a) (2020) id. 79-32,110.18. This is not the most ambitious return for real estate investments one digitalinvesting platform in commercial real estate advertises an 18 -plushistorical return on its investments. See CADRE, https: www.cadre.comhttps: perma.cc AHD3-L 7 (stating on its homepage historical returns).Of course, the average return for various classes of investment-gradecommercial real estate has varied over time. See eff Fisher, Data, ResearchEduc. Consultant, Nat’l Council of Real Est. Inv. Fiduciaries (NCREIF), DougPoutasse, Exec. Vice President, Head of Strategy Research, entall ennedy,First uarter 2019 NCREIF Indices Review, NCREIF (May 9, 2019),https: www.ncreif.org globalassets public-site webinar--education-page-images webinars webinar-slides-1q-2019-v-3.pdf https: perma.cc PG5-LV2 .19. The model was calculated as follows: $318,000 in value from permanentlyexcluding $1 million in capital gains, $726,332 in value from deferring taxeson remaining $9 million capital gain, $4.5 million in value from a $10 millionbonus in depreciation, and $4.1million in avoided tax value frompermanentlyexcluding taxes from ualified Opportunity Zone gains. ernhard CapitalPartners, Financial Model (on file with the author).20. This hypothetical best-case scenario assumes that the seller’s investment iseligible for all four of the Opportunity Zone tax benefits: permanent exclusionof a portion of taxes on capital gains, deferral of taxes on remaining capitalgains, bonus depreciation, and permanent exclusion of taxes on ualifiedOpportunity Fund gains. See I.R.C. 1400Z (2018).
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who relocate there,21 a residential or commercial development, such as theone described above, can result in a significant economic impact. Forexample, a redeveloped or new building might increase property prices in aneighborhood.22 The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on property pricesnotwithstanding, one pre-COVID-19 study of Opportunity Zone designatedneighborhoods showed a 13.5 price increase for properties that could beredeveloped and a 9.6 price increase for vacant development sites.23 Aredeveloped or new building can lead to construction obs, as well as newcustomers for surrounding businesses.24 In this example, the vision ofOpportunity Zone economic development appears rosy. The neighborhoodgains a new health clinic, space for small business support, and affordablehousing. The local government collects new property tax revenue. And theinvestor has the chance to increase their wealth through market-basedrisk.25 Everybody wins.Now consider a different example. Suppose a real estate developmentcompany owns a number of parking lots in the central business district inPortland, Oregon. Despite the fact that Portland’s economy is booming, all
21. See GREATER TOPE A PARTNERSHIP, https: choosetopeka.com applyhttps: perma.cc RD38-8E74 (inviting prospective relocators to apply forTopeka’s program that pays new residents who stay at least one year up to$15,000 in con unction with employers who hire those workers).22. Cf. Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt Vincent W. Yao, Spillover Effects of
Foreclosures on ei hborhood Property alues, 38 . REAL ESTATE FIN. ECON.387, 390-92 (2009) (asserting and later testing the potential impact ofneighborhood-area foreclosures on the price of homes in thoseneighborhoods that were not sub ect to foreclosure proceedings).23. Alan Sage, Mike Langen Alex Van de Minne, Where is the Opportunity inOpportunity Zones Early Indicators of the Opportunity Zone Program’sImpact on Commercial Property Prices 2 (last revised Oct. 15, 2019)(unpublished manuscript), https: ssrn.com abstract 3385502https: perma.cc P H2-SMMV .24. Some argue that ob growth in distressed areas is particularly beneficialbecause, among other things, the local workers who get obs will value theobs more relative to their opportunity costs. Timothy artik, Should Place
Based Jobs Policies Be sed to Help Distressed Communities 16 ( p ohn Inst.,Working Paper 19-308, 2019), https: research.up ohn.org cgiviewcontent.cgi article 1326 context up workingpapershttps: perma.cc G7Y -728 .25. This example assumes a certain level of local-resident benefit from such aredevelopment. However, the specific amount of benefit and the processthroughwhich such pro ects are approved is not analy edwith any specificity.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 39 : 82 2020
90
of Portland’s downtown area was designated as a ualified OpportunityZone under Section 1400Z-1 of the Internal Revenue Code during the 2018designation process.26 Although the real-estate development company wasalready likely to continue development prior to the Opportunity Zone tool,it now plans a number of new pro ects in several downtown ualifiedOpportunity Zones, including a $206million tower with ground floor retail,six floors of offices, and 200 luxury apartments.27To fund these pro ects, thedevelopment company solicits investments from ualified OpportunityFunds. sing the same financial model discussed above, the $206 millionpro ect would be eligible for up to $198.8 million in Opportunity Zonesubsidies.28The Topeka example appears reasonable a health clinic, kitchenincubator for small businesses, and affordable housing are important realestate uses. Oftentimes, such developments do not occur in themarketplace.ut the luxury high-rise example in Portland, on the other hand, exemplifiesthe extractive nature of the Opportunity Zone. An apartment complex thatwould have been built by market forces alone en oys an almost 100subsidy with little in additional public benefit derived from the subsidy.Further, the Portland subsidy is not only a waste of public resources it maycause serious harms to residents of the affected neighborhoods.29Gentrification and displacement of long-time residents is a likely collateral
26. The Portland designation was the result of community fears of gentrification.
See infra Section IV. .2. Although, in this instance, community involvementexcluded neighborhoods that may have benefitted from designation, greaterparticipation is needed so long as it is linked with more use restrictions andtransparency obligations to avoid this type of waste.27. This account is adapted from an article detailing the high-end residentialdevelopment spawned by Portland’s Opportunity Zone designation. See Noahuhayar Lauren Leatherby, Welcome to a Breaklandia, LOOM ERGSINESSWEE , https: www.bloomberg.com graphics 2019-portland-opportunity- ones https: perma.cc T8H -2W V (describing the role ofOpportunity Zone incentives in constructing the finest for-rent product inPortland’s core business district). Amenities in some such residentialdevelopment included a yoga studio, roof deck, and cantilevered swimmingpool on the eighth floor. d.28. Figures are based on a possible 96.5 additional return, using a best-casescenario where the pro ect qualifies for all of the incentives offered under theOpportunity Zone.29. Capital in ected into a community is not synonymous with capital allocatedfor the benefit of the general public: for investors, the Opportunity Zone maybe ust another tax-reduction vehicle.
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consequence to Opportunity Zone investments in certain neighborhoods.30In fact, new businesses and real estate developments created as a result ofOpportunity Zones may even harm small, local family businesses the veryones which the tool was enacted to aid.31 And the disconnect betweeninvestors seeking tax benefits and residents seeking better neighborhoodsis exacerbated by the lack of a requirement that Opportunity Zone pro ectscreate tangible economic benefits to the community.32In the Portland example, the incentive and the capture-orienteddevelopment illustratedby the Portland case ismore effectively describedas an pportunism one. Developments occurring in Opportunism Zonesoften lack tangible economic benefits needed to improve the lives of thoseliving in poverty.33 Rather, such strategies frequently involve the fleecing ofpublic coffers by investor-opportunists, creating wealth for themselves atthe expense of the individuals, families, and small business owners in low-
30. Data about gentrification caused by Opportunity Zones has yet to be collected.However, one report analy ing data from the mid-2010s found that a lmost69 of the neighborhoods identified as gentrifying in the 2013-2017 datawere either within or ad acent to an Opportunity Zone . ason Richardson,ruce Mitchell ad Eblebi, Gentrification and Disinvestment Do
pportunity ones Benefit or Gentrify Low ncome ei hborhoods, NAT’L CMTY.REINVESTMENT COAL. 12 (2020), https: ncrc.org gentrification20mc cid 2badb6e936 mc eid 4ceb39fa13 https: perma.cc F 9C-M RW .31. As a result, it is not surprising that observers are concerned about theOpportunity Zone benefiting luxury apartment developers, especially if thosepro ects would be built regardless of the subsidy. See, e. ., Sophie uinton,
Lu ury Apartments Get the a Breaks Meant to Boost Low ncome Areas, PEWTR STS (Sept. 25, 2019), https: www.pewtrusts.org en research-and-analysis blogs stateline 2019 09 25 luxury-apartments-get-the-tax-breaks-meant-to-boost-low-income-areas https: perma.cc 663 -PD4G
cf. Nitkin, supra note 5 (noting that a fund in Chicago would have beeninterested in the pro ects regardless of the Opportunity Zone incentives).32. The details of the Opportunity Zone reveal distributional inequalities asfederal tax subsidies flow primarily to investors and current landowners.enefits to residents of low-income areas are likely to be indirect and manymultiples less lucrative.33. In addition, the most productive metropolitan areas in the country are mostlikely to attract investor dollars since incentives increase the more pro ectsgrow in value, which is more likely to occur in areas of greater growth. For adiscussion of the concentration of productive economic activity in cities andmetropolitan regions, see generally Richard C. Schragger, Federalism,
Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2019).
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income neighborhoods. Opportunism Zones are ugly marring thepotential for hope embodied in community-focused, place-based economicdevelopment strategies.Opportunity Zones depart from other place-based economicdevelopment laws in novel, yet troubling ways. I identify and analy e threepillars of place-based economic development in the context of OpportunityZones: use, transparency, and participation. The first pillar, use, focuses onwhether a policy promotes businesses and pro ects that are actually usefulto community residents. When Opportunity Zones are viewed from a useperspective, they demonstrate an alarming lack of pro ect specificity andcontrol that may negatively impact the designated neighborhoods. Analysisalong the second pillar, transparency, reveals how the minimal reportingrequirements make it difficult to determine what benefits, if any,Opportunity Zone investments are having. A focus on the third pillar,
participation, demonstrates the total absence of public or governmentalinvolvement in deciding which pro ects are funded in what neighborhoods.Together, these three aspects present a method of critiquing theOpportunity Zone that aligns with the views advanced by proponents ofcommunity economic development, a view of economic developmentstrategies that aims to improve the lives of the people living in places thatlag economically.34This novel, tripartite se-Transparency-Participation framework isvaluable in a number of ways. Place-based economic developmentstrategies are usually classified by regulators on the basis of the intendeduses of the incentives for example, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit islimited solely to affordable housing creation.35 y focusing in on suchrestrictions, we can see the underlying goals and ob ectives behindparticular place-based economic strategies. Transparency, with respect tohow decisions are made and the data that those decisions generate, is vitalin determining the success or failure of a particular tool. The participation
34. For a useful discussion of community economic development, see, forexample, Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Pro ressive
Politics owards a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV.399 (2001). A fourth dimension of critique, which is presently subsumedwithinmy transparency analysis of one designation, is that several ones thathave received designation are not, and were not, actually distressed. Suchones could receive the bulk of investment dollars flowing to ones. For thepurposes of this research, I will treat designation issues as a component oftransparency. Though, I note here that future research could add suchdesignation as an independent aspect for analysis.35. See infra Section I.C.2.
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frame offers insight into stakeholder engagement. The New Markets TaxCredit, for instance, requires pro ects to be financed through businessentities certified by the .S. Treasury as having a primary mission to serveand be accountable to low-income communities.36 CommunityDevelopment lock Grants, on the other hand, are distributed through theinvolvement of state and municipal governments with local residentengagement.37 More than any previous place-based economic developmenttool, Opportunity Zones lack restrictions based on use, transparency, andparticipation.38ut the se-Transparency-Participation framework also reveals that anumber of the flawsmarring Opportunity Zones are potentially avoidable.39Some of these flaws mirror other place-based economic developmentstrategies, while others are new and different. A community economicdevelopment approach is in contrast to a narrower economic view, whichmay view both the Topeka and Portland examples as equally successful byconsidering investment and economic growth as the sole end ofdevelopment.This Article proceeds as follows. Part I analy es the evolution ofgovernmental efforts to intervene in the economies of specific,disadvantaged places. Tax is the primary fieldwhere such laws are adopted,with immigration law, through the employer-based fifth preference, addedas an additional place-based economic development tool in the 1990s. Overthe course of the last century, such interventions have transitioned from atop-down, government-led approach, to a hands-off, market-basedapproach. The Opportunity Zone represents the culmination of thisdevelopment as the most extreme market-based approach yet.Part II analy es the Opportunism Zone through the se-Transparency-Participation framework in so doing, it unmasks the incentive as a tool tobenefit investors and existing landowners.40 With respect to the use prong,Opportunism Zones mi ht ustify some amount of public expense if thoseresources increased funding toward public goods, such as affordable
36. d.37. See infra Section I. .38. See infra Section II.39. See pportunity ones Hearin s, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Rep. Andyim, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Econ. Growth) (stating, with respect to theOpportunity Zone, that investors, fund managers, and real estate developersbenefit but there does not seem to be much benefit to the broadercommunity ).40. See infra Section II.A.
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housing units41 or community-based infrastructure.42 y failing to considerthose public places which benefit residents but offer minimal value toinvestors, however, the law ignores the use value that real property has toresidents.43 As such, Opportunism Zones place exchange value and usevalue in tension.44 With respect to the transparency prong, OpportunismZones’ lack of transparency creates moments ripe for political pandering.45
41. See, e. ., pportunity one nvestments Create Affordable Homes, Support
Community Revitali ation, ECON. INNOVATION GRO P (Nov. 20, 2019),https: eig.org news opportunity- one-investments-create-affordable-homes-support-community-revitali ation-2 https: perma.cc Z 2G-ZS 2 .The work of Lee Ann Fennell highlights the challenges and pitfalls of craftinga policy response to address the lumpiness of legal housing opinions. See.LEEANN FENNELL, L MPS AND SLICING 162-71 (2019).42. For one proposal to support community-based infrastructure, see Michelle D.Layser,How Place Based a ncentives Can Reduce Geo raphic ne uality, TAL. REV. (forthcoming), https: papers.ssrn.com sol3papers.cfm abstract id 3516469 https: perma.cc 3 W -YHVD .43. Many theorists have taken two concepts of value in economics as central:exchange value and use value. See, e. ., David I. Stern, se alue, E chan e
alue, and Resource Scarcity, 27 ENERGY POL’Y 469, 469-70, 472-73 (1999)(defining the two concepts and discussing their relation to scarcity).Sociologist Harvey Molotch has discussed the relationship between use valueand place. See, e. . Harvey Molotch, he City as a Growth Machine oward a
Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. . SOC. 309, 328 (1976) cf. id. at 310 ( T hevery essence of a locality is its operation as a growth machine. ). For adiscussion of the tension between owners who see the city through the lensof exchange value and residentswho see the city through the lens of use value,see OHN LOGAN HARVEYMOLOTCH, R AN FORT NES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFPLACE 2 (1987) ( The sharpest contrast (and the most important in this book)is between residents, who use place to satisfy essential needs of life, andentrepreneurs, who strive for financial return, ordinarily achieved byintensifying the use to which their property is put. ).44. The theori ation and definition of exchange and use value is typicallyassociated with arl Marx. See, e. ., ARL MAR , Chapter he Commodity
Sections , , and , in SELECTEDWRITINGS 243 (Lawrence H. Simon ed., 1994)(theori ing this distinction).45. ew York imes reporting has revealed how wealthy individuals close to theTrump Administration have influenced one boundary selection and arebenefitting fromOpportunity Zones. See enerally Eric Lipton esse Drucker,
Lawmakers ncrease Criticism of pportunity one a Break, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.6, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2019 11 06 business opportunity-
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In particular, when state governors drew one boundaries, they had thepower to favor certain areas over others.46 The boundary-drawing processwas susceptible to the lobbying efforts of those who stood to benefit fromthe inclusion of certain neighborhoods.47 Further, the total absence of anytransparency beyond the minimal disclosures contained in private taxforms render claims of success essentially incapable of substantiation.48
ones-congress-criticism.html module inline https: perma.cc N9HV-NE L (cataloguing how legislators have reacted to various imesrevelations). Scholars at the Cato Institute have critici ed Opportunity Zonesbecause they create loopholes, market distortions, and incentives to lobby.Chris Edwards, More pportunity one Cronyism, CATO INST. (Oct. 28, 2019,4:45 PM), https: www.cato.org blog more-opportunity- one-cronyismhttps: perma.cc 44GY-SFTA (using the occasion of a ew York imesinvestigation to collect links to the Cato Institute’s criticisms).46. See, e. . Ofer Eldar Chelsea Garber, Does Government Play Favorites
Evidence from pportunity ones 26 (Duke Law Sch., Public Law LegalTheory Series No. 2020-28, last revised Sept. 2, 2020),https: papers.ssrn.com sol3 papers.cfm abstract id 3463541https: perma.cc EV2- V4V (stating that the authors’ empirical evidencesupports the conclusion that there is robust evidence suggesting that, whendrawing Opportunity Zone boundaries, governors favored the interests oftheir political supporters and investors that contributed to theircampaign s ).47. See, e. ., Eddie Small, How a Small Stretch of Land on the Far West Became an
pportunity one, REAL DEAL (Sept. 10, 2019, 7:00 AM),https: therealdeal.com 2019 09 10 how-a-small-stretch-of-land-on-the-far-west-side-became-an-opportunity- one https: perma.cc P7HD-8EP7(describing the efforts of a large landlord to secure Opportunity Zonedesignation for a tract that contained land it sought to develop).48. Notably, more robust reporting requirements were stripped from the finalbill. Compare Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 293, 115th Cong. 2(c) (2017)(establishing periodic reporting requirements), with Tax Cuts and obs Act,H.R. 1, 115th Cong. 13823 (as enrolled Dec. 21, 2017) (enacted) (containingno such requirements). There has been a move to reimpose theserequirements. See S. 1344, 116th Cong. (2019) see also Press Release, .S. Sen.Cory ooker, ooker, Scott, Hassan, Young Introduce ipartisan ill toStrengthen Reporting Requirements for Opportunity Zone Tax Incentive (May8, 2019), https: www.booker.senate.gov news press booker-scott-hassan-young-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-strengthen-reporting-requirements-for-opportunity- one-tax-incentive https: perma.cc E7WF-6R2R(announcing the introduction of S. 1344, and claiming that it would restorethe critical safeguards which were included in the original Investing inOpportunity Act ).
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Finally, Opportunism Zones’ high barriers to entrymean that many of thosewithin the affected communities lack a meaningful chance to participate inthe program.49In Part III, I suggest potential fixes in accordance with the se-Transparency-Participation framework. With respect to use, there havebeen a variety of promising proposals at the federal,50 state,51 and local52levels that would shift the focus of investments from exchange value to usevalue. These proposals would better ensure that the targeted communitiesactually stand to benefit from the investments.53 For the transparencyprong, reforms to open up the designation process and enhance annualreporting requirements would mitigate corruption and enable meaningfulevaluations of the incentive’s performance.54 For the participation prong,reforms to open up the process to community development entities andlocal government bodies would ensure that members of the communityhave a chance to shape and benefit from the investments in theirneighborhoods.55This Article contributes to the growing Opportunity Zone literature byarguing that Opportunity Zone incentives are for the benefit of the
opportunists the investors, developers, existing landowners, and the
49. See infra Section II.C.50. .S. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon has proposed the Opportunity ZoneReporting and Reform Act to impose reporting requirements and to restrictones to exclude high-income areas designated in the initial one selection,among other reforms. S. 2787, 116th Cong. (2019). This is not the first reformbill suggesting the Opportunity Zone investments be reported. See S. 1344.The sentiment of at least one lawmaker is that reform is needed or, in theabsence of reform, total elimination is required. Lipton Drucker, supra note45.51. See, e. ., H.R. 4010, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 6(1)-(2) (Ore. A-EngrossedFeb. 24, 2020) (calling on the Legislative Revenue Officer to study theoperation, benefits, impact, and effectiveness of the federal opportunity oneprogram in Oregon and stipulating that that inquiry be conducted inconsultation with various stakeholder groups).52. For example, the City of oulder, Colorado created an Opportunity Zoneoverlay district preventing the demolition of attached dwelling units in thedesignated census tract 122.03. See O LDER, COLO. M N. CODE tit. 9, ch. 3 9-3-12 (2019).53. See infra Section III.A.54. See infra Section III. .55. See infra Section III.C.
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consultants and experts advising them who stand to en oy a windfall. Thepolitical ustifications for Opportunity Zone enactment improvingimpoverished areas are merely incidental to the tax benefits posed towealthy investors by the legislation’s mechanics. Without key reforms thatdraw from a community-based economic development approach,Opportunism Zones will hurt the individuals and communities they purportto help.I. GOVERNMENT ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS IN PLACEIn order to analy e the design of the Opportunity Zone tool,56 and makeassertions regarding how best to udge its effectiveness, it is important tounderstand the recent history of government economic developmentinterventions in particular places.57 Government development
56. In referring to theOpportunity Zone as a tool and not a program the authoradopts the language of ruce at and eremy Nowak. ruce at and eremyNowak, Guidin Principles for pportunity ones, GOVERNANCE PRO ECT 4,https: www.thenewlocalism.com wp-content uploads 2018 03 Guiding-Principles-for-Opportunity-Zones TheNewLocalism March92018.pdfhttps: perma.cc 4 YA-FTA8 (noting that tax incentives like theOpportunity Zone are but one economic development tool among many).57. roadly, economists have argued that local governments compete for mobileresidents by ad usting tax burdens and services offered in specific locations.
See, e. ., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure heory of Local E penditures, 64 . POL.ECON. 416, 418 (1956) ( T he consumer-voter may be viewed as picking thatcommunity which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. ).Relatedly, governments, especially at the local level, intervene in particularlocations to spur economic development. See, e. ., Martin E. Gold, Economic
Development Pro ects A Perspective, 19 R . L. 193, 199-201 (1987)(discussing state and local economic development tools and constraints).Economic development strategies come in many different policy flavors. See,
e. ., Peter R. Pitegoff, Community Development Finance and Economic Justice,
in LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FOR THE R AN CORE: FROM THE GRO ND P, 89, 89-107(Peter Enrich Rashmi Dyal-Chand eds., 2019) (providing a historical surveyof select economic development policy). Peter Pitegoff contrasts traditionaleconomic development with community economic development, the lattertreating community stakeholders as partners and agents in economicdevelopment. d. at 91-92 (drawing on the work of William Simon to presentfour core principles of the community economic development movement:community as beneficiary of economic development, community as agentin economic development activity, constraint on property rights through theinvolvement of charitable entities, and the imperative of local participation
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interventions typically occur on a spectrum of two mechanisms at oppositeextremes. On one end of the spectrum are large-scale, government-fundedinfrastructure or other public spending pro ects.58 New Deal erainterventions in the economy were historic in impact and in the creation ofthe federal administrative state, and also weak with respect to localparticipation and accountability.59On the other end of the spectrum, government interventions to developthe economy of particular places have, in recent years, shifted to taxincentives or outright tax abatements.60 Place-based economicdevelopment tax incentives or tax incentives tied to the development ofspecific areas exist in a number of types, and are varied at the state andlocal level.61 Such legal tools focus on particular neighborhoods and censustracts with markers like high poverty and high unemployment.62 In recent
(quoting and citing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMM NITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTMOVEMENT 76-78, 113, 143, 168 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).The theory behind the Community Economic Development movement itself isa more recent development, though it has its roots in earlier politicalmovements. See id. at 90-96 cf. Cummings, supra note 34 (honing in on theascendan t market-based CED as the ob ect of critique).58. See Pitegoff, supra note 57, at 5 (describing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’sNew Deal policies as signaling a sea change in rural and urban federaleconomic development policies).59. See id. at 5.60. See, e. ., RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITYPOWER: R ANGOVERNANCE IN AGLO ALAGE 46-51 (2016) (challenging the notion that subnational governments ought to besetting industrial policy) Edward W. De arbieri, Lawmakers as Job Buyers,88 FORDHAM L. REV. 15, 18 (2019) (discussing how lawmakers, particularly atthe state and local level, compete by allocating tax incentives to influencebusiness location decisions). As large-scale, government-backed, eynesian-style spending has lost favor, pro-market, neoliberal tax incentives haveproliferated in urban economic development policy both in the .S. and in the. . SeeWeaver, supra note 8, at 25-27.61. See Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place Based nvestment a ncentives ar et
Low ncome Communities A Multi State Survey of Enterprise one a
ncentives ( niv. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-29,2019), https: papers.ssrn.com sol3 papers.cfm abstract id 3381243https: perma.cc VE86-E4RW (cataloguing the variation of place-basedeconomic development tax incentives at the state level).62. The federal New Markets Tax Credit program, for instance, allows for taxincentives in areas with at least 20 of individuals at or below the poverty
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market-based examples, however, wealthy investors are often the primarybeneficiaries when the stated purposes of the government’s interventionare to benefit the economy of the designated area.63Opportunity Zones are best understood as the culmination of a multi-decade evolution of place-based economic development strategies and theideologies underlying such tools. The historical description and analysispresented here reveal a shift in place-based economic development toolstoward an embrace of the free market. Opportunity Zones exemplify theworst tendencies of these recent market-based approaches.This Part begins with a discussion of ustifications for economicdevelopment policy and the normative values of a community-basedapproach that ought to undergird interventions in local economies. Next,the Part addresses large-scale government interventions in the economiesof places and the issues presented by such centrali ed exercise of power andcontrol. Then, it highlights and evaluates tools like the CommunityDevelopment lock Grant that overcame some of the ma or issues of thetop-down model by decentrali ing power. The Part then examines recentprograms like the E -5 immigration regime and the Low-Income HousingTax Credit, which show, in some instances, decentrali ation has gone toofar. Finally, this Part introduces the Opportunity Zone as the most extremeinstantiation of the decentrali ing principle.
rate. I.R.C. 45D(e)(1)(A) (2018). urisdiction-wide tax incentives not tied toparticular areas often focus explicitly on the creation or retention of obs. See,
e. ., TIMOTHY . ARTI , W. E. P OHN INST. FOR EMP’T RESEARCH, A NEW PANELDATA ASE ON SINESS INCENTIVES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFERED Y STATEAND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE NITED STATES 1 (2017),https: research.up ohn.org cgi viewcontent.cgi article 1228 context reports https: perma.cc A 9M-N AD (discussing ob creation tax credits).63. See Drucker Lipton, supra note 2 see also Editorial, he nvestor isa
Pro ram Should Be Scrapped, LOOM ERG (Mar. 22, 2018),https: www.bloomberg.com opinion articles 2018-03-22 the-eb-5-investor-visa-program-deserves-to-be-scrapped https: perma.cc G69H-VW6D (arguing for immigration based on talent and experience, and evenauctioning of green cards instead of the current system of selling visas towealthy foreign investors in commercial real estate). In addition, such lawstypically lack a private right of action to sue to stop benefits extended underprograms to develop particular places.
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A. Economic Development Policy and aluesA guiding principle underlying economic development is thatgovernmental interventions in the economies of particular places ought tobe limited to creating particular real estate, infrastructure, and evenbusinesses and neighborhood amenities, that are both necessary and willnot otherwise be constructed by market participants. Professor Michelle D.Layser discusses the need for place-based economic developmentinterventions as a response to spatial mismatch, meaning that areas of highunemployment result from a mismatch between low-skilled workers andthe dearth of ob opportunities available to them.64 The challenge in craftingan ideal economic development policy is to take account of market forces atplay, their limitations, and areas where market forces are inadequate atachieving economic development.Economic development strategies should embody certain values,including productivity, transparency, and participation of local residents.Such normative values for place-based economic development strategiesalign with those articulated in the community economic developmentmovement practice and theory.65With respect to productivity, developmentactivities should fill market gaps by, for example, incentivi ing housingcreation for low-income individuals in places where there is an insufficientsupply of affordable housing. With respect to transparency, it is importantto be clear about the intended beneficiaries of such programs, and whateconomic benefits those beneficiaries are receiving. With respect toparticipation, an ability for local residents to offer perspective on theirunique needs is necessary. Place-based economic development strategieshave not always kept these values in focus.
64. See Layser, supra note 42 at 15-16.65. For recent explorations of community economic development literature, seePriya askaran, Renee Hatcher and Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, Buildin
Brid es E aminin Race and Privile e in Community Economic Development,28 . AFFORDA LE HO SING COMM NITY DEV. L. 203 (2019) Scott L. Cummingset al., Community Economic Development s Access to Justice, 27 . AFFORDA LEHO SING. COMM NITY DEV. L. 463 (2019) Peter Pitegoff et al., Community
Development Law and Economic Justice Why Law Matters, 26 . AFFORDA LEHO SING COMM NITYDEV. L. 31 (2017).
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B. Lar e scale Government nterventions in Place Based Economic
DevelopmentFor much of the early twentieth century, economic development policywas characteri ed by large-scale public investment.66 The concentration ofwealth in private hands at the start of the 1900s led to massive market-regulatory reforms that shifted power to government.67 Scholars like .Sabeel Rahman have pointed to the Gilded Age and efforts of reformers likeLouis randeis to hold private corporate power accountable throughantitrust, public utility regulation, and the offering of public options,including rural electrification cooperatives.68 Through the large-scalegovernment interventions of the New Deal, the federal government usedthis consolidated power and resources to create economic opportunity.69Notable examples of such large-scale interventions include the TennesseeValley Authority, which radically transformed underdeveloped rural areasthrough the construction of a series of dams for electrification, publichousing, and adopting significant employment initiatives.70 Similarly, the
66. See Pitegoff, supra note 57, at 92-93.67. . Sabeel Rahman, Challen in the ew Curse of Bi ness, AM. PROSPECT (Nov.29, 2016), https: prospect.org economy challenging-new-curse-bignesshttps: perma.cc Z73 -T97 .68. d. Rahman applies lessons learned from the first Gilded Age to regulating theNew Gilded Age. . SA EELRAHMAN, DEMOCRACYAGAINSTDOMINATION (2016).69. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 outlined a Second ill of Rights in hisState of the nion Address. Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the nion Messageto Congress ( an. 11, 1944). President Roosevelt’s notion of an economic billof rights was designed to protect individuals from the vagaries of the market.
SeeWeaver, supra note 8, at 13. Among those economic rights articulated byRoosevelt were a right to employment, a decent home, adequate medical care,protection from economic fears, and a good education. See Roosevelt, supra.70. See Pitegoff, supra note 57, at 92-93. The Wilson Dam, built by the TennesseeValley Authority to create Wilson Lake around the time of World War I, wasone of many dams that created inexpensive electricity to power much of thesoutheastern nited States. See enerallyDRIVE- Y TR C ERS, A, on THE FINEPRINT: A COLLECTION OFODDITIES ANDRARITIES (NewWest 2009) (demonstratingpublic affection for the Tennessee Valley Authority).
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location of large Department of Defense contractors significantlytransformed the economies of numerous localities.71These kinds of top-down approaches to federal economic developmentcontinued through the 1950s, but were accompanied by massive flaws,including racial segregation.72 Post-WorldWar II-era urban redevelopmentefforts furthered segregation by generating both public housing pro ectsand racially homogeneous suburbs.73 In the 1960s, the EconomicOpportunity Act of 1966 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 sought to correctracial inequities of previous programs.74 These reform efforts adopted ashift towards partnerships with private sector banks and developers tofinance housing construction and ob creation in poor areas.75 Nonetheless,the negative effects of these early programs are coming into focus as theconnection between place as a center for social and economic opportunityis developing in the literature.76 Places matter in designing governmentinterventions in policy since places matter to people.77 Specific racialgroups, such as African Americans, have made minimal progress towardsracial equality following the civil rights era in part because theircommunities and neighborhoods have faced persistent discrimination,severe disinvestment, and rigid segregation.78 ltimately, then, many mid-
71. Navy yards, for instance, have historically employed tens of thousands ofworkers in industries tied to defense contracting. The rooklynNavy Yard, forexample, peaked at over 70,000 workers during World War II. See LaurenCook, Brooklyn avy Yard Surpasses , Jobs for st ime in over Years,AMNY (Aug. 5, 2019), https: www.amny.com news brooklyn-navy-yard-obs-1.34563648 https: perma.cc MG4M-M7H2 .72. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW O RGOVERNMENT SEGREGATEDAMERICA 17-20 (2017).73. See id. at vii-xi (arguing that the federal government endorsed a de uresegregated housing policy through much of the twentieth century).74. See Pitegoff, supra note 57, at 94.75. d.76. See, e. ., Ra Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren Lawrence F. at , he Effects of
E posure to Better ei hborhoods on Children ew Evidence from the Movin
to pportunity E periment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855, 857 (2016) (finding thatchildren whomove to lower-poverty areas during youth have increased ratesof college attendance, higher incomes, and decreased rates of singleparenthood).77. See artik, supra note 24, at 32.78. See PATRIC SHAR EY, ST C IN PLACE: R AN NEIGH ORHOODS AND THE END OFPROGRESSTOWARDSRACIALE ALITY 5 (2013).
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twentieth century place-based economic development strategies wereundermined by their failure to include marginali ed groups.Despite these drawbacks, large-scale government interventionscontinued to en oy bipartisan support into the early 1970s.79 However, ashift occurred in the 1970s with the Community Development lock Grantsincluded in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, a tool toincrease the diffusion and revenue sharing of federal economicdevelopment.80 In the words of one team of researchers, the CommunityDevelopment lock Grant is, historically speaking, the most si able, stable,and comprehensive support for community and economic development. 81It was created through compromise between those wanting to devolvedecision-making to the state and local level and those wanting to supportlow-income communities.82
79. The 1972 budget of Richard Nixon’s Administration, for instance, called forfiscal and monetary policy to promote full employment, as well as revenuesharing between states and cities. SeeWeaver, supra note 8, at 27-28. Aroundthis time, Nixon famously said: I am now eynesian in economics. LeonardS. Silk, i on s Pro ram Am ow a Keynesian, N.Y. TIMES, an. 10, 1971, atE1. A Nixon campaign radio advertisement argued: W e have to getenterprise into the ghetto, but also the people of the ghetto into enterprise.
Mehrsa Baradaran on Black Banks & he Racial Wealth Gap, Season , Ep. ,IPSE DI IT ( an. 22, 2019) https: shows.pippa.io ipse-dixit epi-sodes mehrsa-baradaran-on-black-banks-the-racial-wealth-gaphttps: perma.cc DY42-DDZY .80. See Pitegoff, supra note 57, at 94.81. See rett Theodos, Christina Plerhoples Stacy Helen Ho, akin Stock of the
Community Development Block Grant, R . INST. 1 (Apr. 2017),https: www.urban.org sites default files publication 89551 cdbg brief finali ed 1.pdf https: perma.cc RY3D- NL . Funding for CommunityDevelopment lock Grants have stagnated at around $3 billion per year. d. at2. The Opportunity Zone will likely dwarf the amount of funds that theDepartment of Housing and rban Development spends on the CommunityDevelopment lock Grant. Cf. Drucker Lipton, supra note 2 (suggesting thescope and scale of the Opportunity Zone).82. See ALLEN R. HAYS, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND R AN HO SING 222 (2012) AliceO’Connor, Swimmin a ainst the ide A Brief History of Federal Policy in Poor
Communities, in R AN PRO LEMS AND COMM NITY DEVELOPMENT 77, 80-81(Ronald F. Ferguson William T. Dickens eds., 1999) Theodos et al., supranote 81, at 1 (citing CDBG A Year History, 54 . HO SING COMM NITYDEV. L.20 (1999)). There are two tracks of funding: (1) grants administered toentitlement communities, and (2) grants directly administered by states thatopt in or small cities in states that do not opt in. See id at 5.
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The diffuse nature of Community Development lock Grants throughlocal governments and local-level bodies make rent-seeking and captureby those with resources more difficult. In many ways, this shift away fromthe top-down nature of earlier strategies is what makes the CommunityDevelopment lock Grant so successful. Community Development lockGrants further the community-oriented side of community economicdevelopment. At the same time, demonstrating the impact of CommunityDevelopment lock Grants remains key to their survival. The broad power-sharing nature of the strategy can make disclosure of the tool’s successmore difficult. Otherwise, the program faces criticism based on thebureaucratic nature of the disbursal, which can sometimes be slow, and thelack of market-based principles with which funds are distributed. Therban Institute recently analy ed the state of the Community Developmentlock Grant and made a number of recommendations that includedincreasing funding and increased data collection, as well as othertransparency initiatives.83That said, the future of the Community Development lock Grant isuncertain. nder the Trump Administration, Community Developmentlock Grant funds were eroed out, with that administration arguing thatthe Grants are not targeted to poor communities and had not demonstratedan impact on those communities.84 For the 2020 budget, the Senate restoredfunding for the Community Development lock Grant.85 The idenAdministration has proposed expanding Community Development lockGrants by $10 billion over ten years.86
83. Theodos et al., supra note 81, at 5, 13, 14.84. Press Release, .S. Dep’t Hous. rb. Dev., TrumpAdmin. Proposes 2020H Dudget (Mar. 11, 2019), https: www.hud.gov presspress releases media advisories H D No 19 027 https: perma.cc S 2H-Y23 ( Since 1980, and most recently in 2013, H D studies found that CD Gis not well targeted to the poorest communities and has not demonstrated ameasurable impact on communities. ).85. See Erin Patterson, Senate Passed Fiscal Year Appropriations Packa e
Benefits ir inia, A C 13 NEWSNOW (Oct. 31, 2019, 2:21 PM),https: www.13newsnow.com article news politics senate-passed-fiscal-year-2020-appropriations-package-benefits-virginia 291-0dc3fb44-b328-4b60-bf94-d98e68640fe1 https: perma.cc 5 LZ-9D 4 .86. The iden Plan for Investing in Our Communities through Housinghttps: oebiden.com housing https: perma.cc 8WZH-EV .
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C. Place Based Economic Development Shifts to a Hands ff ApproachIn the 1980s and 1990s, market-based interventions in the economybegan to win bipartisan support among elected representatives.87Government interventions in the economy of places in recent decadesgenerally have followed a neoliberal ideology.88 The transition to such toolsreflects a pro-growth viewpoint that particular places are in greater needthan others of government support.89 Neoliberal doctrine advances thenotion that competitive and deregulated open markets are the mosteffective tool for economic development and societal well-being.90However, these hands-off approaches to development, including theOpportunity Zone, frequently lack clear goals,91 definable metrics,92 and
87. See Cummings, supra note 34, at 421-22 ( T he advent of Reaganneoconservatism in the 1980s followed by Clintonian neoliberalism in the1990s led to a deterioration in the economic conditions of the poor and shiftedantipoverty programs toward market-based reform strategies. ). The sametype of bipartisan support exists for Opportunity Zones. See, e. ., Edwards,
supra note 45 Eric Lipton esse Drucker, Symbol of Greed Stands to Profit
from rump a Break for Poor Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019),https: www.nytimes.com 2019 10 26 business michael-milken-trump-opportunity- ones.html https: perma.cc GCY4-6M3 .88. See enerallyWEAVER, supra note 8 passim.89. Michelle D. Layser, he Pro Gentrification ri ins of Place Based nvestment
a ncentives and a Path oward Community riented Reform, 2019 WIS. L.REV. 745 (2019) (discussing how the flexibility of current place-basedeconomic development tax incentives are unsurprising given their pro-growth business and political champions).90. See Cummings, supra note 34, at 422 evin Fox Gotham Miriam Greenberg,
From to Post Disaster Recovery and Rebuildin in ew York and
ew rleans, 87 SOC. FORCES 1039, 1041 (2008).91. The topic of how national goals with respect to community developmentinteract with local priorities has been addressed in Sarah F. Liebschut ,
Community Development Dynamics ational Goals and Local Priorities, 2 ENV’TPLAN. C: GOV’T POL’Y 295, 295-305 (1984) (finding that communitydevelopment reflects both local priorities and national goals).92. Among states, there is little uniformity in how laws take metrics into account.
See Layser, supra note 61 (surveying the structure and design elements ofstate enterprise ones and finding significant variations across one eligibilityrequirements, eligible investment types, incentives to invest in workers orworkforce housing, and taxpayer eligibility).
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basic reporting requirements.93It was not surprising for conservatives to support market-basedeconomic development tools. Such support is consistent with their overallpolitical ideology and offers another ustification to cut federal aid tocities.94 nderstanding liberal support for such market-based tools is notmuch more difficult. Timothy Weaver argues that Democrats in Congressgradually turned to a neoliberal viewpoint to solve the problem of urbanpoverty and unemployment.95 Relatedly, if there is a program that willdirect funds to communities in need, it is not difficult to understand politicalbuy-in and support.Research analy ing existing market-based place-based economicdevelopment tools indicate a number of disturbing findings that can becategori ed through the se-Transparency-Participation frameworkoutlined in the Introduction. With respect to use, a strategy that focusesplace-based strategies in particular areas of great need is more efficientthan allocating resources into areas where need for such strategies is less.For example, ob growth in distressed areas has a greater impact than innon-distressed areas.96 However, place-based strategies are often nottailored to address those areas in most need of aid.97 Relatedly, place-basedincentives favor industries that may not be the industries that most benefitthe local communities.98 With respect to transparency, successes of place-based economic development strategies are only evident throughdisclosure and reporting of outcomes. Research on the effectiveness ofplace-based interventions is mixed.99 It is increasingly difficult to measure
93. The provisions governing the Opportunity Zone currently lack reportingrequirements. See I.R.C. 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2 see also ooker, supra note 48(announcing a bill to rectify this).94. SeeWEAVER, supra note 8, at 70.95. d. at 70-71.96. See artik, supra note 24, at 18 (describing how ob growth in distressed areaswill have greater private benefits since local workers will obtain more obsthan those workers will highly value).97. In the Opportunity Zone context, for instance, elected officials designatedareas for reasons other than the greatest need. See Section II. infra.98. See ALAN H. PETERS PETER S. FISHER, STATE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS: HAVETHEY WOR ED 9 (2002) (finding that incentives are skewed towards morecapital-intensive industries and manufacturing processes).99. Layser summari ed the empirical research around place-based tax incentives,concluding that their impact on poor communities remains unclear. See
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the impact of place-based economic development incentives given theprevalence of business location incentives that lack a particular placefocus.100With respect to participation, some strategies appear ineffective atachieving their goals for local residents. Place-based tools like stateenterprise ones, for instance, do not have a significant impact on localemployment 101 and little impact on growing the economy.102 Despite theweaknesses revealed through this se-Transparency-Participationframework, lawmakers often still operate under the assumption thatneoliberal ideology is correct and that a free market approach is thebest.103
Layser, supra note 9, at 405 n.8. Growth will sometimes come at the cost ofnon one obs and economic activity. See Marilyn Rubin, rban Enterprise
ones Do heyWork Evidence from ew Jersey, 10 P . DGETING FIN. 3, 17n.33 (noting that 2.5 of enrollees in New ersey’s rban Enterprise Zoneprogram came into the program from other parts of the state) (1990) cf.Timothy . artik, Jobs, Productivity, and Local Economic Development What
mplications Does Economic Research Have for the Government, 47 NAT’L TA .847, 851 (1994) (regarding economic development subsidies, the success ofone area causes negative externalities for other areas. ). In another study, oneresearcher found no net loss of economic activity in neighboring areas tothose with place-based disaster recovery economic development incentives.
See Randall . unker, Are Re ional a nvestment ncentives a ero Sum
Game AnEmpirical Analysis of the Gulf pportunity one Act of , 13 .ACCT.FIN. 118, 119 (2013) (indicating an initial conclusion that the Act had a ero-sum effect on neighboring areas but noting that the conclusion thatneighboring areas were harmed by the Act was not statistically significant).100. See artik, supra note 24, at 1 ( We currently devote $60 billion a year topolicies that aim to increase obs in some state, or in some local labormarket. ). artik also notes that the current system for bringing obs to peoplein state and local government does not favor distressed places. d. at 2.101. SeeDaniele ondonio ohn Engberg, Enterprise ones and Local Employment
for the States Pro rams, 30 REGIONAL SCI. R . ECON. 519, 522 (2000).102. PETERS FISHER, supra note 98, at 13 WEAVER, supra note 8, at 161 163(finding that the effects of empowerment ones were negligible on growingthe economy of Philadelphia). In some instances, researchers have presentedevidence of harmful impacts with respect to expanding public debt andspeculative private sector involvement. See PETERS FISHER, supra note 98, at103-26.103. This appears to be the case with the Opportunity Zone legislation. Despite itsinitial bipartisan support, the Opportunity Zone incentive seems primed to dowhat other tools have done create wealth generation opportunities for
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This Subsection presents both a descriptive and analytic account of therange of federal, state, and local place-based economic development tools.It beginswith the Employment- ased Fifth Preference, or E -5 tool, basedin federal immigration law. Next, the Subsection shifts to focus on taxtools those that are disaster-based, and those that are not. Next, itaddresses state-based enterprise ones, and the expired federalempowerment one law. This Part then addresses the most recent federalplace-based economic development tool: the Opportunity Zone.1. Immigration Place- ased Development ToolsIn an example of decentrali ation of economic development planninggone too far, in 1990, Congress adopted a Green Card program known asE -5 for foreign investors who fund commercial real estate pro ects in poorareas.104 Initially, the tool required foreign nationals seeking permanentresidency in the nited States to invest one million dollars in a pro ectcreating at least ten obs for .S. workers.105 The tool was expanded in 1992to expedite approval through regional centers in which eligible pro ectscould be located, expand the ob creation requirement to include indirectobs such as service-based obs aiding direct hires, and cut the investmentamount to only $500,000.106 Today, 10,000 visas are made available eachyear through the E -5 program.107 To receive one of these visas, investors
businesses already moving ahead with pro ects. See Timothy Weaver, a
Law s pportunity one Won t Create pportunity for People Who eed t
Most, SALON (May 21, 2018, 10:30 AM), https: www.salon.com 2018 0521 tax-laws-opportunity- ones-wont-create-opportunities-for-the-people-who-need-it-most partner https: perma.cc EF 6-VRVG (calling insteadfor urban social citi enship where community members invest inneighborhood pro ects).104. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 4989 (codifiedat 8 .S.C. 1153(b)(5)) see also INA 203(b)(5) 8 C.F.R. 204.6.105. d.106. Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1846 (2002). The investment amountwasnot tied to inflation and has not increased in almost 30 years. ob GoodlatteChuck Grassley, Opinion, Restorin nte rity to the mmi ration System,WASH. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https: m.washingtontimes.comnews 2018 may 16 why-the-department-of-homeland-security-must-final https: perma.cc CN6E- AH .107. David North, he mmi ration nvestor EB isa A Pro ram that s, and
Deserves to Be, Failin , CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION ST DIES ( anuary 2012),
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and qualified family members need not create businesses themselves, butrather they can invest in a commercial enterprise within a regionalcenter.108In addition, the E -5 tool includes Targeted Employment Areas that areeither (1) rural areas with under 20,000 people, or (2) areas with at least150 of the national unemployment rate.109 Investments in TargetedEmployment Areas need only be $500,000.110 In 2017, approximately halfthe visas granted through the E -5 tool were to Chinese nationals investingin Regional Target Employment Areas.111The apparent purpose of the E -5 tool is to combine the need foreconomic development in particular areas with a demand for .S. greencards. An advocacy group representing organi ational members thatcomprise the Regional Center Program touts pro ect successes through anumber of metrics dollars invested and obs created being the mostexpediently highlighted.112 Yet, merely indicating the amount of fundsinvested, or number of obs created, does not tell the full story about theimpact of E -5. Specifically, such metrics do not address whether placesmost in need of investment are the ones where pro ects are in fact created.In addition, metrics about dollars and obs alone do not tell the story aboutthe people who may have benefitted from the creation of those real-estatepro ects.113
https: cis.org sites cis.org files articles 2012 investor-visa-program-is-failing.pdf https: perma.cc 6LYD-65TA .108. See 11 .S.C. 1153 note (2018).109. d.110. d.111. In that year, 4,441 visas out of a total of 9,602 issued went to Chinesenationals. Report of the Visa Office 2017, able mmi rant isas ssued by
Forei n State of Char eability or Place of Birth Fiscal Year , .S. DEP’T OFSTATE (2017), https: travel.state.gov content travel en legal visa-law0 visa-statistics annual-reports.html https: perma.cc 5HGL-EP L(follow link and navigate to Statistical Table III to access the document).112. Lee Li, EB s Essential to the .S. Economy, INVEST IN THE SA (2018),https: californiaeb5investments.com wp-content uploads 2018 11 E -5-is-Essential.pdf https: perma.cc TDL9-FEC .113. Dollars invested and obs created are important to know quantitatively, but itis difficult to be certain that those dollars and obs arrived as a result of theE -5 program. To make that claim, we must engage in a study of the pro ectsthat have been invested in as a result of the program, andwemust also control
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Instead, a more thorough analysis of the E -5 tool reveals many abusesof the program. Most disturbing, participants often do not have to invest indistressed communities at all in order to receive an E -5 visa. Instead,wealthy urban developers reportedly sell visas to foreign nationals not forany clear public benefit, but simply as a cheap source of capital.114 Whenparticipants actually do invest, the results are far from what the E -5program promises. Senator Chuck Grassley pointed out that minimuminvestment amounts have not been increased in decades, and that pro ectsmeant for rural and poor areas are focused in already affluent urbanhubs. 115 Supporting Grassley’s claim, currently 93 of E -5 pro ects arereal estate developments located in regional centers, mostly located inma or cities, which often have been designated regional centers throughgerrymandering to achieve a coveted high-unemployment designation.116As a result, this location-based investment tool designed to bring capital topoor areas has funded luxury developments in expensive areas such as NewYork City,117 everly Hills,118 and Palm each, Florida.119 The end result is
for other economic development or any other factors that may otherwiseconfound analysis. Such a study is beyond the scope of the current Article.114. See Goodlatte Grassley, supra note 106.115. d.116. Editorial, he nvestor isa Pro ram Should Be Scrapped, LOOM ERG (Mar. 22,2018), https: www.bloomberg.com opinion articles 2018-03-22 the-eb-5-investor-visa-program-deserves-to-be-scrapped https: perma.cc G69H-VW6D . Observers have pointed out that the geographic boundaries of theTargeted Employment Area are meaningless since nearly any location can beconsidered as having enough unemployment to qualify. See Gary Friedlandeanne Calderon,EB Reform on theHori on f the PalmHouseHotel Debacle
Does ot Precipitate Con ressional Action, What Will , N.Y. . STERNCTR. FOR REAL ESTATE FIN. RESEARCH 4 (Mar. 2019),https: www.stern.nyu.edu sites default files assets documents E -5 20Reform 20on 20the 20Hori on 20-20If 20the 20Palm 20House 20Hotel 20Debacle 20Does 20Not20Precipiate 20Congressional 20Action 2C 20What 20Will.pdfhttps: perma.cc F69 - 7C9 .117. Friedland eanne Calderon, supra note 116.118. d.119. d.
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not improvements in the lives of disadvantagedAmericans but ratherwasteand widespread allegations of fraud.120Similarly, the Targeted Employment Area designation standards varyfrom state to state.121 A federal approach to designating particular high-needs areas may curb abuses in the tool. There are additional areas forimprovement too. The E -5 tool lacks any meaningful engagement withlocal communities in which pro ects are located.122 Lack of any localparticipation may indicate potential pro ect mismatch between needs,goals, and wants of current residents, and the goals of those investingcapital. 2. Tax Place- ased Development ToolsMost place-based economic development tools function through tax lawat the federal or state level.123This section separates out into four importantareas of tax law: the New Markets Tax Credit, Low-Income Housing TaxCredits, disaster-related relief programs, and state-based Enterprise Zones.a. New Markets Tax CreditsCongress has adopted several generally available tax-baseddevelopment tools for the purposes of economic development. One suchtool, the New Markets Tax Credit, allows investors to purchase tax creditsto reduce their own tax liability in exchange for investing in a commercialreal estate pro ect in a low-income community. The credit works as follows.An entity with significant tax liability, such as an insurance company or a
120. See Goodlatte Grassley, supra note 106 see also Editorial, supra note 116.Editors at loomberg suggest the programbe scrapped because of insufficientfocus on supporting poor areas. See Editorial, supra note 116.121. See E -5 Immigrant Investor Program Moderni ation, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4,738(proposing federal standardi ation of Targeted Employment Areadesignation).122. See 8 .S.C. 1153 (2018). This is in contrast to other place-based economicdevelopment tools, such as the Community Development lock Grant, whichinvolves local government and often community residents in deciding howbest to disburse funds for development pro ects in poor areas. See 42 .S.C.5301 (2018).123. Municipal or local economic development incentives exist in the form ofproperty tax abatements. This Article, however, does not cover those tools indepth.
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bank like Citibank, can reduce its taxable income by purchasing a credit tooffset its liability. Citibank purchases a $1 tax credit for $0.90.124 The taxsyndicator fromwhich Citibank purchased the credit then turns around andmakes the capital provided by Citibank available for pro ects in a low-income community led by a member of the New Markets Tax CreditCoalition a membership organi ation of Community DevelopmentEntities that take part in the New Markets Tax Credit.125 The Coalitionreports that since 2000 the New Markets Tax Credit has led to $95 billioninvested in nearly 6,000 pro ects, creating 1,000,000 obs at a cost of$20,000 per ob.126 Proponents claim that this tool is able to achieve thisimpressive result by reducing the cost of capital for commercial real estatepro ects in areas that need it.127
124. Pricing of the tax credit reflects a variety of factors, including the risk that thecredit will be recaptured, as well as the time value of money. Martin D.Abravanel et al., ew Markets a Credit M C Pro ram Evaluation Final
Report, R . INST. 87 (Apr. 2013) http: www.urban.org sites default filespublication 24211 412958-New-Markets-Tax-Credit-NMTC-Program-Evaluation.PDF https: perma.cc 2 P-Z S8 (noting that New Markets TaxCredits are allocated over a seven-year period, rather than at the time ofinvestment).125. See, e. ., ew Markets a Credits, ENTERPRISE COMM NITY PARTNERS,https: www.enterprisecommunity.org financing-and-development new-markets-tax-credits https: perma.cc MWH5-G 3Z ew Markets a
Credits, CITIGRO P, https: www.citigroup.com icg saciticommunitycapital docs NMTCTransactions-FINAL.pdfhttps: perma.cc YN3E-T3HF . Note that the specific examples and figureswere supplied for illustrative purposes. Professor anet ackson Thompsonprovides another illustrative example of how the tax credit works in a recentarticle. See anet Thompson ackson, Can Free Enterprise Cure rban lls Lost
pportunities for Business Development in rban, Low ncome Communities
hrou h the ewMarkets a Credit Pro ram, 37MEM. L.REV. 659, 697 (2007)
see also Pitegoff, supra note 57, at 11.126. About the M C, NEW M TS. TA CREDIT COAL.,https: nmtccoalition.org progress-report about-the-nmtchttps: perma.cc YF2E-L 5 .127. See id. ( P articipants are significantly lowering the cost of capital forborrowers in low-income communities and exceeding statutory andregulatory requirements for the targeting of economic distress. ).
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The geographic boundaries for the New Markets Tax Credit tool arelimited to census tracts with poverty rates of at least 20 .128 The NewMarkets Tax Credit program allows participants to self-certify.129 This self-certification process allows participants to include pro ects based onwherequalified Community Development Entities, a necessary party to theissuance of the credit and which themselves must certify with the CDFIFund, can articulate pro ect need.130When President Clinton was campaigning for the New Markets TaxCredit, he completed a four-day tour across the country, vising parts of thecountry with high poverty and unemployment, including rural Mississippi,East St. Louis, a Native American reservation in South Dakota, SouthPhoenix, and the Watts neighborhoods in Los Angeles.131 In stumping forthe NewMarkets Tax Credit, President Clinton noted that, while the surginginternet economy was raising the economic boats for most, many placeswere still left behind.132In this regard, the New Markets Tax Credit resembles the E -5 inrecogni ing that some areas are more in need of capital than others. Animportant difference, however, is the way in which the New Markets TaxCredit developed a transparency requirement.Specifically, the regulation the Credit offers through the involvement ofCommunity Development Entities brings disclosure and transparency that
128. I.R.C. 45D(e)(1)(A) (2018). Tax scholar Michelle Layser, who has researchedand published extensively on the New Markets Tax Credit, has explored howthe credit has led to gentrification. Michelle D. Layser, supra note 89, at 53-54(discussing how pro ects created using the New Markets Tax Credit may leadto gentrification). One recent observer has argued for performance ob ectivesand recapture provisions should participants in the New Market Tax Creditfail to serve low-income communities. See Meghan okath, ake the Money
and Run A Case for Benchmarkin in the ew Markets a Credit Pro ram, 47CAL. W. L. REV. 411, 414 (2011).129. See Treas. Reg. 1.45D-1(g)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2012) (instructing thetaxpayer to file Form 8874 in order to claim the NewMarkets Tax Credit).130. See Dimitri Pappas, A ew Approach to a Familiar Problem he ew Market
a Credit, 10 . AFFORDA LE HO SING COMM NITY DEV. L. 323, 325 (2001)(discussing the role of Community Development Entities in identifyingpotential pro ects of businesses for investors to support).131. Lily Geismer, he Places Left Behind, ACO IN, (Nov. 1, 2016),https: acobinmag.com 2016 11 bill-clinton-poverty-tour-hillary-new-markets https: perma.cc SC 2-3VM3 .132. d.
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is lacking in many other place-based economic development strategies.Community Development Entities are mission-based, tax-exemptorgani ations regulated by the Internal Revenue Service,133 and certified bythe Community Development Financial Institutions Fund of the .S.Treasury. y nature of this regulatory involvement, pro ects that involveNew Markets Tax Credits must be issued by Community DevelopmentEntities. The inclusion of an intermediary organi ation is key to thetransparency that the New Markets Tax Credit imbues.134 Furthermore,transparency is also enhanced by the fact that the geographic boundariesare set by a clear formula rather than an opaque district drawing process.In this way, the New Markets Tax Credit both overcame ma or issuesassociated with the previous top-downmodel by decentrali ing power, andavoided excesses of some market-based tools.It is true that some Community Development Entities are formed bylarge banks.135 It is possible that lenders that control a certified CommunityDevelopment Entity could use NewMarkets Tax Credits to advance pro ectsthat have some advantage for the lender. Many New Markets Tax Creditpro ects, for instance, include retail uses as part of the overall mixed-usenature of the pro ect. Nevertheless, in a variety of regulatory filings, theCommunity Development Entity is still required to articulate the aspect ofhow the use of NewMarkets Tax Credits are appropriate.136Despite these advantages, the New Markets Tax Credit program is notwithout its shortcomings. Of note, because residents lack standing tochallenge the use of the Credit in court, there are few legal remediesavailable to third parties to dispute the manner in which a party claims orissues a NewMarkets Tax Credit. Accordingly, litigation under the programis infrequent.137 For example, in one case a trial court udge in the nited
133. That is, insofar as tax-exempt entities must comply with I.R.C. 501(c)(3)(2018).134. See Lambie-Hanson, supra note 9, at 7-8.135. Roughly one-third of CDEs formed by CDFIs, community development banks,and other mission-driven lenders received allocations of tax credits between2002-06, while 17 of CDEs formed by for-profit financial institutionsreceived tax credit allocations during the same period. See Abravanel, supranote 124, at 61.136. d. at xii.137. A Westlaw search conducted on December 11, 2019 using the search termnew markets tax credit for all federal and state urisdictions yieldedfourteen results for dates ranging fromMarch 16, 2015 toNovember 20, 2018.
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed acomplaint brought by a gas station owner who ob ected to the issuance ofNew Markets Tax Credits to the owner of an ad acent property to constructa gas station rest stop.138 In issuing its ruling, the court found that theprogram lacked a private right of action.139 The absence of a private right ofaction makes transparency of the New Markets Tax Credit that much moreimportant.Despite its market-based approach, the NewMarkets Tax Credit overallperforms well on the se-Transparency-Participation framework. The useof the tax credit is directed by a clear formula to define the availableinvestment areas and the presence of an intermediary institution thatguides dollars toward fruitful investments. These aspects of the programalso advance the goal transparency, as individuals in the community havegreater purview into where dollars can be and are being spent. However,the presence of large for-profit lenders acting through intermediaryorgani ations, and the lack of a private right of action to challenge the useof the Credit, indicates room for improvement with respect to participation.b. Low-Income Housing Tax CreditsThe Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, the largest .S. governmentintervention in the rental housing market, was designed to stimulate theconstruction of affordable housing units that otherwise would not be builtby market participants.140 Adopted as part of the tax reform of 1986, theprogram allows nonprofit and for-profit developers to rehabilitate or
One such case highlighted that the New Markets Tax Credit lacks a privateright of action for individuals to claim a violation of the law. SeeWestmorelandReal Estate, LLC v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:11CV1648 CDP, 2012 WL 2458403,at 7 (E.D. Mo. une 27, 2012) ( In order to state a 42 .S.C. 1983 claim,plaintiffs must allege that their federal rights were violated, but the statutedoes not provide plaintiffs with any substantive rights. ).138. d.139. d. ( In order to state a 42 .S.C. 1983 claim, plaintiffsmust allege that theirfederal rights were violated, but the statute does not provide plaintiffs withany substantive rights. ).140. randonM.Weiss, Residual alue Capture in Subsidi ed Housin , 10 HARV. L.POL’Y REV. 521, 525 n.17 (2016) (estimating that the federal governmentforegoes approximately $8 billion per year in revenue through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, dwarfing other supply-side spending on housingconstruction).
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construct housing for low-income individuals using federal tax credits.141 Intheory, the tailoring of this tax incentive to a particular use is novel andsignificant. Linking the credit to a particular use in this case, housing forindividuals and families of limited means provides a clear connectionbetween the use of public funds and an agreed-upon public purpose.In practice, ensuring that the units of housing are built in the areasmostin need remains a challenge. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit strugglesat delivering the right number of units at the price that people acrossincomes can afford and in places peoplewant to live. In recent congressionaltestimony, Low-Income Tax Credit expert irkMcClure pointed out that thecredit has created a surplus of housing in some areas, while failing toprovide adequate housing in others areas, particularly those with very lowincomes.142 In particular, housing constructed using the credit is frequentlyin areas where there is already a supply of housing and at rents that areclose to market rents.143 This distortion in the allocation of Low-IncomeHousing Tax Credits was the sub ect of a recent Supreme Court case inwhich the Inclusive Communities Pro ect argued that the Texas Departmentof Housing and Community Affairs violated the Fair Housing Act in itsallocation of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.144 Professor randonWeisspoints out that nclusive Communities articulates the long-standing housingpolicy debate about whether governments should be supporting housingconstruction in lower income, largely nonwhite, neighborhoods in theurban core, or in higher-income, predominately white, suburbs.145 Policydebates about how to develop the economy of poor areas mirror thoseregarding the construction of affordable housing.146
141. I.R.C. 42 (2018).142. America s Affordable Housin Crisis Hearin Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 117thCong. 10-11 (2017) (statement of irk McClure, Professor, niversity ofansas).143. See randon M. Weiss, Locatin Affordable Housin he Le al System s
Misallocation of Subsidi ed Housin ncentives, 70 HASTINGS L. . 215, 219-20(2019).144. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Pro ect, Inc., 576 .S.519, 531 (2015). While the Court did not reach the merits of the claimconcerning the location of allocated credits, it did for the first time recogni edisparate impact as a way to prove a Fair Housing Act violation. d. at 543-47.145. SeeWeiss, supra note 143, at 219.146. Housing itself is an important economic driver of place-based developmentthough, for this Article, the focus is particularly on economic developmenttools with place-based characteristics.
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Returning to the se-Transparency-Participation framework, a keytakeaway from the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit is the restriction on theuses that builders may achieve through the Low-Income Housing TaxCredit. It is an incentive limited to affordable housing construction. Taxesotherwise collectible by government are forewent in exchange foraffordable housing construction that builders as market participantsotherwise would not build. While such a restriction is a positivedevelopment, the program also demonstrates that smart design is of limitedvalue if not properly implemented. This only further demonstrates the needfor transparency and participation to ensure that a program actuallydelivers its intended result.c. Disaster-Related Toolsnlike the more general development tools discussed above, disaster-related economic development tools arise in response to natural or human-created disasters.147 This Subsection analy es the Liberty Zone in LowerManhattan and the Gulf Opportunity Zones in the southeastern nitedStates using the se-Transparency-Participation framework. These insightsare particularly valuable in the current moment, as I have argued alongwithother scholars that governmental responses to the COVID-19 pandemicrelated to mitigating housing instability ought to include both place-basedand people-based strategies.148The Liberty Zone following the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 was the first congressional tax benefit program to target a particulardisaster-impacted geographic one.149 At the time, some called for the
147. For background on the treatment of individual giving following disasters, seeDanshera W. Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief Rationali in
a Conse uences and ictim Benefits, 57 CATH. . L. REV. 427 (2008).148. Michelle D. Layser et al., Miti atin Housin nstability Durin a Pandemic, 99OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) https: perma.cc 6 HW-AG8D .149. See evin Fox Gotham,Dilemmas of Disaster ones a ncentives and Business
Reinvestment in the Gulf Coast After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 12 CITYCOMM NITY 291, 292 (2013). In this case, a total of $20 billion in aid was splitbetween $8 billion for infrastructure improvements related to theDepartment of Transportation and the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency’s emergency aid, and $12 billion for economic development. GothamGreenberg, supra note 90, at 1044. The approximately $12 billion in fundingfor economic development was split as follows. First, $3.7 billion inCommunity Development lock Grants were administered by a state-city
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expansion of government-led welfare programs, activist interventions tostabili e communities and neighborhoods, and even the creation of a newfederal agency.150 Instead, neoliberal ideas prevailed, and the result was apublic-private partnership model to redevelop the area.151 Residentialdevelopment of high-end condominiums and rental properties werefinanced largely through Liberty onds.152 As a result, the greatestrecipients of the private activity bonds were Larry Silverstein, developer ofthe new World Trade Center buildings Goldman Sachs, which constructeda new headquarters ad acent to the world trade center site andcorporations such as ank of America, which located its headquarters inmidtown, miles from lower Manhattan.153As a place-based economic development strategy, one can view theLiberty ond askance. Funds were used for development following aparticularly crucial moment following a terrorist attack, and somedevelopment occurred outside the main area surrounding the attack. Thegovernor of New York State and the mayor of New York City, along with anewly formed public authority, distributed the funds. The governor andmayor were politically accountable to voters however, participation in the
corporation called the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation. Second,authority to allocate $8 billion in private activity bonds called Libertyonds used to reconstruct buildings in LowerManhattanwere placed underthe oint control of the Governor of New York and the Mayor New York City.
d.150. See Gotham Greenberg, supra note 90, at 1043-44.151. See Robert olker, he Power of Partnership, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 26, 2001),http: nymag.com nymetro news sept11 features 5425https: perma.cc 7Y- A R . As Gotham and Greenberg point out, relyingon privatemarkets to handle disaster recovery removes public accountabilitysince there is no longer a requirement that expenditures be for a publicbenefit. Gotham Greenberg, supra note 90, at 1043. Low-income workersand small businesses were not prioriti ed in the funding program by design.
d. at 1047. Legislators allocated funds for a series of tunnels, including a raillink to .F. . Airport and the suburbs connecting lower Manhattan. Eliotrown, he unnel from owhere, O SERVER (Mar. 24, 2009, 10:56 PM),https: observer.com 2009 03 the-tunnel-from-nowherehttps: perma.cc GP88-VVDL . Such a pro ect (which was eventuallydropped) potentially would have benefitted visitors and out-of-townersmuchmore than local residents and small business owners.152. olker, supra note 151. The average income of residents in the neighborhoodincreased. d.153. See Gotham Greenberg, supra note 90, at 1050.
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program by residents was not a significant component of Liberty onds. Apolicy outcome of the Liberty Zone was that it has been mimicked in futuredisaster recovery legislative efforts. The most prominent is the recovery ofthe Gulf Region following Hurricanes atrine, Rita, andWilma.154Gulf Opportunity Zones provided the ability for the states of Alabama,Louisiana, and Mississippi, or any municipality or locality within thosestates, to issue bonds for redevelopment.155 Research indicates that GulfOpportunity Zone investments did not have a significant negative economicimpact on neighboring areas that were outside the Zone.156 atrina, theworst natural disaster in the nation’s history with respect to geographicscope, led to significant population displacement of persons out of the area,which is difficult to account for through empirical analysis.157 Gothampoints out thatwhile government officials publicly touted that the aidwouldgo to the hardest hit areas, in fact, itwent to areaswith the greatest potentialfor future growth and investment not those hardest hit by the storm.158d. State-based Enterprise Zones Federal Empowerment Zones
154. In December 2005, ust several months after Hurricane atrina made landfallin New Orleans, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to include theGulf Opportunity Zone tax program. Among other things, the programextended tax benefits related to Hurricanes Rita and Wilma to victims ofHurricane atrina. I.R.C. 1400T (2018).155. I.R.C. 1400N(I). The total amount of bonding authori ed was $2,500 perperson in the state as of a certain date. d. 1400N(a). The total amount of GulfOpportunity Zone onds authori ed was approximately $8 billion. d.1400N(b). A challenge of the Gulf Opportunity Zone was the timing of theauthority to issue bonds. Credit all but dried up in 2007 and 2008. As a result,even viable pro ects could not take advantage of the bondsmade available. SeeGotham, supra note 148, at 301. Gotham indicates that approximately 44 ofaid went to promote manufacturing and oil industry infrastructure, and all ofthose pro ects were located outside of the New Orleans metropolitan area. d.at 304.156. unker, supra note 99, at 119 (indicating an initial conclusion that the act hada ero-sum effect on neighboring areas but noting that the conclusion thatneighboring areas were harmed by the act was not significantly negative).157. d. at 130.158. Gotham, supra note 149, at 305.
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In the context of place-based economic development incentives, thelaboratories of democracy appear to be malfunctioning.159 State enterpriseone legislation serves broadly to influence business location decisionsthrough amenu of possible incentives that vary by state.160The best policieshave not necessarily spread across the states and up to the federalgovernment. Rather, enterprise ones which in many instances haveproven unsuccessful have spread across states and the federalgovernment.161While 33 of the 50 states have state enterprise one programs today,they are not necessarily uniform.162 Differences exist with respect toeligibility requirements, eligible investment types, incentives to invest inhuman capital or affordable housing, and taxpayer eligibility. 163 Acrossthese differences, however, the commonality appears to be that theseprograms generally lack a clear vision of what they are attempting toachieve. One study found that there is considerable confusion about thegoals of state Enterprise Zone laws and the mechanisms used to achievethose goals.164 Zone incentives favor capital over labor and are a chaoticand unplanned state-based industrial policy.165 In the end, EnterpriseZones do not appear to improve spatial access to opportunity, such asincreasing employment for those workers in need of obs.166
159. ustice randeis famously wrote that in areas of social and economic policy,a single courageous state . . . may serve as a laboratory to experimentwithout harm to the country as a whole. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285.S. 262, 311 (1932) ( randeis, ., dissenting).160. See PETERS FISHER, supra note 98, at 21-52.161. aren Mossberger, State Federal Diffusion and Policy Learnin From
Enterprise ones to Empowerment ones, 29 P LI S: . FEDERALISM 31, 32, 47(1999).162. See Layser, supra note 92, at 1. Layser, in her work to map the typology offederal and state tax incentives, shows significant differences across differentstates. d.163. d.164. PETERS FISHER, supra note 98, at 6.165. d. at 14.166. Cf. id. (stating that Enterprise Zones do not improve spatial accessibility ofemployment to the disadvantaged ).
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Nevertheless, in 1993 the federal government entered the fray with thepassage of the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities Act.167 Inthe implementation of the federal empowerment program, evidencesuggests that the federal law was based on summary information ratherthan specific state goals or outcomes.1683. Investing in Opportunity Actuilding on this overall evolution toward market-based economicdevelopment tools, Congress adopted the Opportunity Zone, the latestplace-based economic development tool, as part of the 2017 tax overhaul.Opportunity Zones attempt to attract capital to disadvantaged communitiesthat continue to struggle following the Great Recession by offering taxincentives to investors. An investor who places funds in a ualifiedOpportunity Zone can defer all capital gains for a ten-year period endingDecember 31, 2026.169 In addition, funds kept in a ualified OpportunityZone Fund can receive a stepped-up basis on the appreciation in value ofreal estate held through the end of the calendar year 2026.170 As ofDecember 14, 2018, the .S. Treasury announced the final opportunity one
167. See Omnibus udget Reconciliation Act of 1993, I.R.C. 1391-1397(d)(1994), amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 951-952, 111 Stat. 788, 885 see also Mossberger, supra note 160, at 32 (arguingthat enterprise one policy at the federal level has often diffused down tostates, rather than individual states serving as particular policy laboratories).The Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities Program was enactedby Congress through the Omnibus udget Reconciliation Act of 1993. MarilynMarks Rubin, Can Reorchestration of Historical hemes Reinvent Government
A Case Study of the Empowerment ones and Enterprise Communities Act of, 54 P . ADMIN. REV. 161 (1994).168. See Mossberger, supra note 160, at 36 (arguing that states tend to pick upeconomic development ideas not by following the example of one particularstate but rather by seeingwhat a cluster of other states are doing). Some laws,such as the federal Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities Act,featured a preference for applications that reflected broad local-levelstakeholder engagement. Sarah F. Liebschut , Empowerment ones and
Enterprise Communities Reinventin Federalism for Distressed Communities,25 P LI S: . FEDERALISM 117, 120 (1995) (describing the significant level oflocal autonomy offered local plan designers).169. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. 13823 (2017) see also I.R.C. 1400Z-1 (2018)(describing the one designation process).170. I.R.C. 1400Z-2(c).
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designations for all 50 states, Puerto Rico, the .S Virgin Islands, AmericanSamoa, and Guam.171The graph below shows a comparison of estimated per-year cost of theplace-based economic development tools discussed so far. The Low-IncomeHousing Tax Credit is the most costly tool at roughly $9 billion per year.172Next highest is the Community Development lock Grant at around $3billion per year,173 followed by Liberty Zones and Gulf Opportunity Zones at$2 billion174 and $0.9 billion, respectively.175NewMarkets Tax Credits haveheld steady at around $1.4 billion per year, rising to $1.9 billion in 2019following Congressional expansion. 176 The E -5 tool does not actuallyinvolve an outlay of federal dollars, so it is listed as $0. The OpportunityZone, since it currently lacks any reporting requirements, is a big questionmark. The cost of the tool depends on howmuch is invested, something that
171. See Cmty. Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, pportunity one Resources, .S. DEP’TTREAS RY,https: www.cdfifund.gov Pages Opportunity-Zones.aspxhttps: perma.cc 7 H -SF Z .172. What s the Low ncome Housin a Credit and How Does t Work , TA POL’YCTR. (May 2020), https: www.taxpolicycenter.org briefing-book what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work https: perma.cc 4 GZ-CFZ .173. H D Exchange, CDBG Fundin and umber of Metro Cities & rban Counties,
by Fiscal Year, .S. DEP’T HO S. R . DEV., https: www.hudexchange.infoonecpd assets File CD G-Allocations-History-FYs-1975-2014.pdfhttps: perma.cc E64D-W8AM (providing data for 1975 through 2014).174. See Gotham Greenberg, supra note 90, at 1044 (stating that $20 billion inLiberty onds are allocated over ten years, which is $2 billion per year).175. See unker, supra note 99, at 119 (estimating the cost at $9 billion, over 10years, which is $0.9 billion per year). Spending for Fiscal Year 2020 was $3.4billion. H D Exchange, CD G Activity Expenditure Reports, .S. DEP’THO S.R . DEV., https: www.hudexchange.info onecpd assetsFile CD G Expend NatlAll.xlsx.176. TA POL’Y CTR., supra note 171 Ayrianne Parks, ew Markets a Credit
Receives ne Year, Billion E tension, NEW M TS. TA CREDIT COAL. (Dec. 20,2019), https: nmtccoalition.org 2019 12 20 new-markets-tax-credit-receives-one-year-5-billion-extension https: perma.cc 48R -RW37 .
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wewill not find out without mandatory reporting.177However, preliminarydata suggests that the program’s costs will be significant.178
And yet, despite the potentially hefty price tag, the Opportunity Zoneappears to embrace a hands-off strategy.179 Proponents of the OpportunityZone legislation appear to agree that particular outcomes are less importantthan increasing investment in poor areas broadly. Specifically, the
177. One voluntary reporting source shows $7.57 billion in capital raised throughanuary 2020. See NOVOGRADAC, supra note 6. As discussed above, it’s possibleto have as great as a 96.5 tax expenditure through the Opportunity Zone. Seeernard Capital Partners, supra note 19. nder a 96.5 assumption, the costbased on the voluntarily reported data could be as much at $7.3 billion takenover 10 years, a modest $0.73 billion. However, the total amount of fundsraised is likely much higher than the voluntary reporting.178. EASTMAN AEDING, supra note 9, at 6. Further, regulations indicate that theprogram could continue through 2047 and costs of the program couldincrease. d.179. Timothy Weaver has pointed out that the theoretical model underpinningOpportunity Zones is a neoliberal belief in supply-side economics that hasshaped urban economic development policy in the nited States and nitedingdom for decades and across political ideology. Cf.Weaver, supra note 103(stating that the fundamental approach of the Opportunity Zone is nothingnew, as it bears the intellectual heritage of the Thacherian enterprise one ).
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legislation is agnostic about what types of pro ects are created, by whom,and for what purpose.180In 2019, at a White House gathering, Senator Tim Scott of SouthCarolina, a sponsor of Opportunity Zone legislation, commented thatOpportunity Zoneswereworking because property values in the designatedones had already increased 20 percent.181 Senator Scottwent on to say thatthe increased property value was a positive outcome since half of residentsin the ones owned their own properties.182 As discussed in more detailbelow, this singular focus on increasing property values belies the fact thatproperty value, a form of exchange value, only really benefits ownerslooking to sell or command increased rents. To benefit from increasedproperty values, an ownermust sell and exit, charge higher rent to a tenant,or borrow against the increased value of the property and use the loanproceeds for another expense or investment. Put another way, proponentsof Opportunity Zones appear singularly focused on increasing exchangevalue of land by attracting mobile outsider capital, not on improving thelives of individuals who live in the communities the incentive purports toserve.Furthermore, early research indicates that the tool will not actuallyincrease investment in areas starved for capital. Opportunity Zoneboundary designations included areas immediately ad acent toneighborhoods in transition or that were already starting to receive outsideinvestment.183 Reports have identified that previously proposed orapproved pro ects can exploit Opportunity Zones instead of attracting new
180. The legislative text talks about designating Opportunity Zone boundaries in amanner consistent with existing state and local economic developmentpro ects, but it does not say, for instance, that affordable housing pro ects,green markets or grocery stores, public or private infrastructure pro ects, orother types of uses are preferred. Certain businesses already banned fromreceiving other tax benefits such as massage parlors, racetracks, and liquorstores, and other businesses listed in the Internal Revenue Code,144(c)(6)( ), are excluded from Opportunity Zone incentives as well. I.R.C.1400Z-2(d)(3) (2018).181. See The White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of ExecutiveOrder Establishing aWhite House Council on Eliminating Regulatory arriersto Affordable Housing ( une 25, 2019), https: www.whitehouse.govbriefings-statements remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-establishing-white-house-council-eliminating-regulatory-barriers-affordable-housing https: perma.cc 55S4-M FH .182. d.183. See Eldar Garber, supra note 46, at 9.
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investment which runs counter to the law’s stated purpose.184 Studies ofprevious place-based economic development efforts are unable to concludethat such laws achieved what they set out to do: to increase the economicvitality of poor areas.185 All of this suggests that Opportunity Zones may belittle more than Opportunism Zones, playgrounds for rent-seekers.II. OPPORT NISM ZONESIt is too early to definitively comment on the outcomes of theOpportunity Zone.186 Nevertheless, the past two years provide ample basisto analy e the legislation, identify its flaws, and propose a framework forassessing how to udge its successes and weaknesses. In conducting thisanalysis, I employ the se-Transparency-Participation framework. Thisframework reveals troubling issueswith the design of theOpportunity Zonetool. These design flaws are not innate in place-based economicdevelopment strategies rather, they reflect an extension of the market-based approach to its outermost extremes. Without any limitations on use,investors are able to deploy tax credits to fund pro ects of limited tangiblebenefit to the broader community indeed, these pro ectsmay actually harmresidents. Without transparency in designating Opportunity Zones ortracking investments, accountability is lacking and corruption thrives.Finally, without opportunities for meaningful participation from thecommunity, the stated beneficiaries of the tool are instead rendered passivebystanders, mere spectators as outside investors reap profits. In sum,without immediate reform, Opportunism Zones threaten to do exactly theopposite of what they promise.
A. seThe first vector along which Opportunism Zones should be analy ed is
use: What types of assets and benefits does the tool create for the
184. See Nitkin, supra note 5.185. See Layser, supra note 9, at 405-06 n.8.186. Two recent reports have offered early analysis of the Opportunity Zone’sefficacy. See Richardson et al., supra note 30 rett Theodos et al., An Early
Assessment of pportunity ones for E uitable Development Pro ects ine
bservations on the se of the ncentive to Date, R . INST. ( une 2020),https: www.urban.org sites default files publication 102348 early-assessment-of-o s-for-equitable-development-pro ects 0.pdfhttps: perma.cc T9F -7 8F .
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community Part I catalogued the various use limitations posed on previousdevelopment strategies. For example, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit,as the name suggests, limits use of tax credits for affordable housingpreservation and development. y contrast, the Opportunity Zone is almostentirely silent with respect to use limitations.187 nder the law, there arethree types of ualified Opportunity Zone Property: qualified opportunityone stock, qualified opportunity one partnership interest, and qualifiedopportunity one business property.188While the tool allows for investmentdirectly into a business, through stock investment or percentage ownership,there is no mention of the particular type of business.189 In casting a widenet with respect to what uses investors may do with ualified OpportunityFunds, Congress has apparently placed great faith in the idea that investorswill direct their investments to uses that are actually needed.This faith is misguided. Despite investors’ abilities to direct capital tobusinesses, their focus appears to be on business property andcommercial real estate in particular.190 The motivation is no mystery. Thestatute provides that investors can avoid all federal income tax invested ina ualified Opportunity Fund as long as the fund has a low value at the endof an initial holding period, which expires at the end of 2026.191 Investors,in this instance, who sell property held in a ualified Opportunity Fundfollowing 2026 en oy tax-free capital gains. This tax incentivemaximi ationstrategy is referred to as a -curve.192 As such, the Opportunity Zone toolfavors investors who find unicorn businesses or properties that will have
187. The Opportunity Zone text only references sin businesses referenced in theInternal Revenue Code 144(c)(6)( ) as excluded. I.R.C. 1400Z-2(d)(3)(2018).188. 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).189. 1400Z-2(d)(2)( )-(C).190. 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D) see also Nitkin, supra note 5 (reporting the interest frominvestors in directing capital into ualified Opportunity Zone funds with afocus on commercial real estate in Opportunity Zones).191. See, e. ., Libin Zhang, Sprin time for pportunity ones and E clusion of All
Gain, 165 TA NOTES 1587, 1587 (Dec. 9, 2019) (citing 1400Z-2(b)(2)(A)(i)).192. d. at 1588 ( A OF and its investorsmay take action to help achieve a curve,by investing in start-ups and other non-real-estate qualifiedOpportunity Zonebusinesses that may experience an initial period of negative cash flow andnegative returns. ).
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low initial value in 2026 the end of a ten-year required holding periodand then increase rapidly in value afterwards.193Without a use preference articulated in the law, investor imagination islikely to proliferate ideas to maximi e financial return rather than improvethe lives of individuals actually living in the community. To understandwhythis outcome is so pernicious, it is critical to understand the centraldifference exchange value and use value.se Value vs. Exchange ValueIn the late 1980s, sociologists ohn Logan and Harvey Molotch co-authored a seminal book on the political economy of place.194 In that book,Logan and Molotch argue that urban development follows a pro-growthagenda favoring exchange value of commercial real property over the usevalue that such property affords residents.195 Specifically, they theori e thecity as growth machine, perpetuating market-based, value-freedevelopment.196 The neighborhood is the battleground where e chan e
value, or commodification, of residential property competes with use value,or benefits and en oyment residents derive from real property.197Logan andMolotch identify six categories of use value. They are: (1) thedaily round, (2) informal support networks, (3) security and trust, (4)identity, (5) agglomeration benefits, and (6) ethnicity.198 First, one’s placeof residence provides access to the daily round, defined by the ability toshop, work, access education and transportation, centers of health care, andother necessary daily routines.199 Second, one’s place of residence offersvalue in terms of informal support networks, which offer ways for people
193. d. at 1588-59 (offering as a possible example low-income housing whererents are capped initially).194. LOGAN MOLOTCH, supra note 43.195. d. at 1-4.196. d. at 32 ( They unite behind a doctrine of value free development the notionthat free markets alone should determine land use. ) see also, Molotch, supranote 43, at 309-10.197. d. at 99 ( From the point of view of residents, the creation and defense of theuse values of neighborhood is the central urban question . . . . ).198. d. at 103-10.199. d. at 103-04.
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and families to take care of one another in a mutually satisfactory way.200Third, through these informal support networks one’s place of residenceshould provide security and trust which in turn generate membership andprotection.201The final three categories of use value focus on connectednessof individuals and groups based on shared background. One’s place ofresidence is connected with one’s identity.202 There are agglomerationbenefits associated with many people of a shared identity or ethnicity livingor working in a single place.203 Lastly, individuals with shared ethnicitiesshare common bonds that are developed within a neighborhood.204The categories of use value articulated by Logan and Molotch onlyscratch the surface of the many ways in which places matter to people. yunderstanding the importance of these various dimensions of space, we canbegin to understand that while exchange value is certainly a necessary andimportant component of how families advance socially and economically, itis ust one piece of a much larger pu le.205 se values the ways thatpeople derive social and economic benefits from place are often reflectedin exchange values, but the two categories are not interchangeable.206
200. d. at 104-05. This can include sharing the obligations associated withchildcare or other family or personal responsibilities. d.201. d. at 105-07. The notion of protection through eyes on the street and otherforms of protection afforded by neighborhoods is included in the use value ofsecurity and trust. d.202. d. at 107-08. Who we are and what we do has a great deal to do with wherewe are from, and where we identify with as being from.203. d. at 108-09. There are rich stories of clustering of business together inorder to cooperate in attracting customers while also competing on price andservice. See, e. ., Corey ilgannon Andrea Salcedo, How the mmi rant
Dream Died in a Shantytown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019),https: www.nytimes.com interactive 2019 12 18 nyregion willets-point-development-queens.html https: perma.cc 7NL9-S 38 (reportingon an auto repair shop district in ueens, New York that was displaced by acity-sponsored redevelopment).204. LOGAN MOLOTCH, supra note 43, at 109-10.205. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 72 passim (noting the importance of residentialhome equity to white suburban families in advancing and growing familywealth and government policies to exclude families based on race from homeownership opportunities).206. For instance, researchers have studied the impact of public-school quality andhousing prices. See, e. ., Theodore M. Crone, House Prices and the uality of
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The particular design of the Opportunity Zone is susceptible to Loganand Molotch’s critique. The incentive’s benefit to residents comes viaexchange value. Yet, there is merely de minimis sharing of exchange valuewith non-owner residents of Opportunity Zones.207 For non-property-owning residents, the benefits are primarily those concerning use value.However, the use value produced by Opportunity Zones is oftenunderwhelming. Part of the outrage about Ama on’s potential secondheadquarters in New York’s Long Island City neighborhood arose from thefact that the office space would be constructed using Opportunity Zoneincentives.208 Further, although the Opportunity Zone may be designed tocreate obs and improve communities, reports indicate that investments areoverwhelmingly flowing into real estate instead of businesses.209
Public Schools What Are We Buyin , FED. RES. AN PHILA. S. REV., Sept.-Oct.1998, at 3, 4-5 (reviewing recent research which in some instances foundconnections between variations in home prices and both school reputationand property tax rates). The concept of homeownership affords a family theability to en oy both exchange value and use value. See LOGAN MOLOTCH, supranote 43, at 20. A home can be mortgaged to pay for things like highereducation, used like a piggy bank when its equity increases, and sold when afamily decides to move or when people pass away. It also has use value, suchas stability for raising children, locating one in a place, and en oying thebenefits of community. In the Logan and Molotch theory, homeowners oftenreceive less attention than do city officials and the business owners withwhom they collaborate. A recent Furman Center study, however, suggeststhat, in urban areas, homeowners aremore powerful than previously thought.Vicki een, osiah Madar Simon McDonnell, rban Land se Re ulation Are
Homevoters vertakin the Growth Machine, 11 . EMPIRICAL L. ST D. 227, 259-61 (2014).207. According to Senator Scott, at least fifty percent of residents of OpportunityZones do not own their property. pportunity ones, SEN. TIM SCOTT,https: www.scott.senate.gov opportunity ones https: perma.cc M4W -TN6 .208. ernard Condon Stephen raun, Ama on s YC Head uarters in
pportunity one Eli ible for G P a Breaks, P SNEWSHO R (Nov. 14, 2018),https: www.pbs.org newshour economy ama ons-nyc-headquarters-in-opportunity- one-eligible-for-gop-tax-breaks https: perma.cc FC4S-LA8G .209. An analysis of 621 OFs found that only four percent of funds had a sole orpartial focus on operating businesses. Theodos et al., supra note 186, at 22(citing Michael Novogradic, ovo radac pportunity Funds List Surpasses
Billion in nvestment, NOVOGRADIC (Apr. 29, 2020),
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Additionally, Opportunity Zones are prone to gentrification because of thespill-over effects coming from bordering neighborhoods that have alreadygentrified.210 For example, research by the inder Institute at Riceniversity indicates that two thirds of neighborhoods in Houstonsusceptible to gentrification are located in Opportunity Zones, indicating alikelihood that rising land values will displace longtime residents.211It is therefore not surprising that arguments used to advance theOpportunity Zone tool emphasi e exchange value over use value. Inadvocating for Opportunity Zones, tech entrepreneur Sean Parker framedthe problem of urban poverty as a capital access problem.212 Essentially,Parker argues that poor urban neighborhoods will improve if the correctincentives to invest are offered.213The reality is much more complex. Parker and other backers ofOpportunity Zones ignore the fact that outcomes matter as much as doesattracting capital.214 Operating in the mindset of value-free development,investors do not care about how their funds are used, as long as the taxbenefits are exploited.215 However, maximi ing exchange value of realproperty does not necessarily improve neighborhoods and communities.Instead, it often threatens their very existence.216
https: www.novoco.com notes-from-novogradac novogradac-opportunity-funds-list-surpasses-10-billion-investmenthttps: perma.cc 7PYZ-WNE ).210. See Richardson et al., supra note 30.211. William Fulton, inder Inst., pportunity ones Gentrification on Steroids ,RICE NIV. (Feb. 20, 2019), https: kinder.rice.edu urbanedge2019 02 20 opportunity- ones-gentrification-steroidshttps: perma.cc 2NE-V86M .212. See ertoni, supra note 11 ( The incentive needs to be powerful enough thatit can unlock large amounts of capital, aggregate that capital into funds andforce the funds to invest in distressed areas. (quoting Parker)).213. Cf. id. ( Instead of having governmental hand out pools of taxpayer dollars,you have savvy investors directing money into pro ects they think willsucceed. (quoting Parker)).214. See LOGAN MOLOTCH, supra note 43, at 13.215. Tax advisers offering advice to ualified Opportunity Zone Fund investorsfocus on the most profit generating pro ects or those with the greatestexchange value. See Zhang, supra note 191, at 1588.216. See LOGAN MOLOTCH, supra note 43, at 111.
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Put plainly, the Opportunism Zone is an exchange value maximi er.217ut maximi ing exchange value fails to account for uses and the use valuethat existing and future residents care about. If the law does not factor inresident use value and fails to measure outcomes, the Opportunism Zonewill struggle to achieve meaningful community development ends.Proponents, wooed by increasing real estate values, may continue to arguefor its efficacy. Yet, residents, many of which do not share in the benefits ofexchange value, will fail to see their use values or exchange values increase.2. People- ased vs. Place- ased StrategiesGovernments can intervene in a local economy either by supportingparticular places or by supporting certain populations. Place-basedeconomic development tools are part of experimental policy, and anaccompanying literature, about place-based versus people-basedgovernmental interventions.218 Importantly, economic development toolsdesigned to attract or retain people are different and apart from povertyalleviation tools, designed to support individual and family needsregardless of impact on the economy.219 For instance, subsidies to groups ofpeople may include population attraction mechanisms, such as assistance
217. Not all government interventions in place have a similar focus on increasingexchange value. In the context of oning, for instance, regulation focuses onuse over ownership or exchange. See, e. ., Michael Alan Wolf, A Common Law
of onin , 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 771, 774 (2019) (arguing for the notion that oningregulates use and not ownership).218. See, e. ., Louis Winnick, Place Prosperity ersus People Prosperity Welfare
Considerations in Geo raphic Redistribution of Economic Activity, in ESSAYS INR AN LAND ECONOMICS: IN HONOR OF THE SI TY-FIFTH IRTHDAY OF LEO GRE LER273, 274 (1966) ( P lace prosperity is only a means to people prosperity. )
see also Layser et al., supra note 148, at 62-71 (proposing both people-basedand place-based recommendations for addressing housing insecurity throughthe policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic).219. For a discussion of people-based and place-based poverty alleviation policies,
see Nestor M. Davidson, Reconcilin People and Place in Housin and
Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. . POVERTY L. POL’Y 1, 10 (2009)(discussing, for example, investments to reduce poverty through supply-sideor demand-side subsidies).
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to pay down student loan debt,220 or a natural resources dividend.221While place-based economic development strategies aim to improveparticular places, they ought to focus on improving the lives of people livingin those places. Here, the Opportunity Zone’s agnosticism with respect touse and the individuals who stand to benefit from particular uses isharmful.222 The singular focus on place and not people demonstrates atroublesome shift away from any consideration of the ideal beneficiaries ofdevelopment: individuals already residing in low-income communities.2233. Insiders vs. OutsidersInterventions in place impact people. Human beings experience placesin different ways.224 Occasional or infrequent visitors to a place will likelyperceive and value it much differently than residents.225 Such inconsistentvisitors, to a productive metropolitan region or isolated backwater, oftenhave a significant effect on the economy.226 nfortunately, the Opportunity
220. See, e. ., ME. STAT. tit. 36, 5217-D (2019) (outlining Maine’s support for newresidents by paying off student loan debt of new arrivals).221. See, e. ., ALAS A STAT. 43.23.005 (2020) (stating eligibility requirements forAlaska oil dividend program).222. This swing towards place-based government intervention, away from people-based government support, illustrates Winnick’s argument that place-basedinvestment is simply a tool to develop people. SeeWinnick, supra note 218, at274-75.223. Further, the Opportunism Zone constitutes a pendulum swing away fromWinnick’s people-focused theory, which comports with the notion ofimproving lives of individuals as an ideal end of development. d.224. For example, while chain stores may provide convenience for some, amovement around a hundred years ago sought to limit the proliferation ofchain stores from neighborhoods. See enerally Richard C. Schragger, he
Anti Chain Store Movement, Localist deolo y, and the Remnants of the
Pro ressive Constitution, , 90 IOWA L. REV. 101 (2005) (detailing thismovement).225. Concertgoers may flood into town, stay at hotels, fill up seats in restaurantsand cocktail lounges and spur a local economy. High season out-of-towntravelers routinely pack streets, sidewalks, beaches, clam shacks, and otherspots of local character, only to depart at the end of the weekend or season.226. Inconsistent weather can keep visitors away toomuch rain does not a beachday make lack of snow means that skiers and snowboarders stay off theslopes.
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Zone lays bare the competition for place between outsiders and insiders inits prioriti ation of the former over the latter.Investments into ualified Opportunity Zone Funds provide investorsthe opportunity to forego capital gains tax if their investments remain in aqualified fund for a ten-year period.227 The publicly-funded incentives for aualified Opportunity Zone investor are potentially enormous. Forexample, the marginal capital gains rate for an individual earning over$434,550 is 20 .228 Thus, the federal government is offering up to a 20subsidy per dollar over a ten-year period, plus any additional earnings, tothe already wealthy. As in any investment scenario, investors will seek tominimi e risk andmaximi e gain. Such a mindset will lead investors to seekout the safest, often the most financially conservative, investment option.This conservativism can manifest itself in a number of ways. Inparticular, more secure forms of commercial real estate are likely to befavored over less secure ones. Hotels, for instance, which favor outsiders inan area, at least prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, were likely to be morefavored by ualifiedOpportunity Zone investors.229Moreover, investors arelikely to prioriti e high-profit pro ects, such as luxury housing, thus limitingthe impact on residents of communities that need investment dollars themost.230All of this amounts to minimal value for insiders. enefits may comethrough indirect ways, such as temporary construction obs, additionalpermanent service-sector obs, or public services which are funded throughproperty taxation. Such increases in property values reach most insiders asindirect benefits, which may be important, are ultimately different thandirect benefits that accrue primarily to landowners. Such benefits of
227. 26 .S.C. 1400Z-2(c) (2018).228. opic o. Capital Gains and Losses, INTERNAL REVEN E SERV.,https: www.irs.gov taxtopics tc409 https: perma.cc 4T 3-93 H .229. Due to the current public health crisis and ensuing economic shutdown,investors are likely to be much more restrained in their Opportunism Zoneinvesting activity. The Treasury offered a number of extensions to ualifiedOpportunity Fund investors due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e. ., Rev.Notice 2020-39, 2020-26 I.R. . 984. Representatives ohn Curtis of tah andHenry Cuellar of Texas introduced the Small usiness Opportunity Zone Actin April 2020 that would designate small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as eligible to receive ualified Opportunity Zone Funds. H.R.6529, 116th Cong. (2020).230. See Layser, supra note 42, at 62 (describing the prioriti ation of luxuryhousing pro ects).
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increased property values to landowners are typically reali ed through exitor a refinancing transaction. Increased land costs can lead to increased rentsand changing neighborhood demographics, rather than a boon forinsiders.231Finally, while outsider investment is encouraged,232 development led byexisting community members is disfavored.233 With respect to barriers toparticipation for existing community members, we will explore this insightin greater detail in Section III.C on Participation below.
B. ransparencyA second lens through which to view the Opportunism Zone istransparency. Congress left the task of designating one boundaries to stategovernors.234 Generally, each state could designate only 25 of low-income
231. LOGAN MOLOTCH, supra note 43, at 111.232. States and cities routinely incentivi e commercial real estate development toentice prospective businesses and to placate those that threaten to leave. See,
e. ., Editorial, Ama on s Golden Fleecin , WALL ST. . (Nov. 14, 2018),https: www.ws .com articles ama ons-golden-fleecing1542230916https: perma.cc WNH3-TNNS .233. For instance, the Community Development lock Grant program allows thecities and counties receiving funding to demand that funds be allocated topro ects on a reimbursement basis, which ensures that pro ects have alreadyengaged in capital-raising. See OFFICE OF CMTY. PLANNING DEV., .S. DEP’THO SING R . DEV., PLAYING Y THER LES: A HAND OO FORCD G S RECIPIENTSON ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS 2-14 (rev. ed. Mar. 2005),https: files.hudexchange.info resources documents Playing- y-the-Rules-a-Handbook-for-CD G-Subrecipients-On-Administrative-Systems.pdfhttps: perma.cc E 7F-WPT7 . This creates difficulty for low-resourcedgroups to move forward with particular pro ects. See, e. ., Pete DeMola,
Miracle on Crai Street in Limbo in Schenectady as onprofit Awaits Buildin
Handover, DAILY GAZETTE (Schenectady, N.Y.) (Sept. 5, 2019),https: dailyga ette.com article 2019 09 05 miracle-on-craig-street-in-limbo-as-nonprofit-awaits-building-handover https: perma.cc YY22-7 43 .234. See I.R.C. 1400Z-1(b)(1) (2018). For an analysis of how states performed indesignating Opportunity Zones, see rett Theodos, rady Meixell CarlHedman, Did States Ma imi e heir pportunity one Selections Analysis of
pportunity one Desi nations, R . INST. ( uly 2018),https: www.urban.org sites default files publication 98445 did states
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community census tracts in a state as ones.235 The Opportunity Zone lawborrowed the New Markets Tax Credit definition of a low-incomecommunity, defining such a community as a census tract with either at least20 of individuals at or below the poverty rate, or the median familyincome is below 80 of the statewide median income or metropolitan areamedian family income.236 Census tracts contiguous to low-incomecommunity census tractswere also able to be designatedOpportunity Zonesso long as the median family income did not exceed 125 of the medianfamily income of the contiguous low-income community census tract.237However, despite these guardrails, it has become clear that the designationprocess is ripe with political pandering and outright corruption. Governorshave favored counties that had supported them in the prior election, andlobbyists have successfully pushed for one designations where individualinvestors stand to gain from the Opportunity Zone.238eyond the designation phase, an ongoing transparency problem is theOpportunity Zone’s lack of an annual reporting requirement. Withoutmetrics to udge the strengths and challenges of this tool, organi ations andprivate parties will be on their own to collect data to assess the OpportunityZone’s effectiveness. A lack of annual reporting has dogged other place-based economic development strategies, such as Community Developmentlock Grant, that benefit from decentrali ed decision-making.239 Yet, thepublic deserves improvement in the Opportunity Zone, not mere mimicry.1. Corruption in the Designation ProcessThe lack of transparency in the Opportunity Zone designation processhas led to political pandering and corruption. One study found that onedesignations favored areas in counties that supported the governor in thelast election.240 Such areas also had higher unemployment and povertylevels, lower incomes, and were on an upward tra ectory with respect to
maximi e their opportunity one selections 7.pdfhttps: perma.cc GW53-C6DA .235. d. 1400Z-1(d)(1).236. d. 1400Z-1(c)(1) ( The term low-income community’ has the samemeaning as when used in S ection 45D(e). ).237. d. 1400Z-1(e).238. See Eldar Garber supra note 46, at 3.239. See Press Release, .S. Dep’t of Housing rb. Dev., supra note 84.240. Eldar Garber, supra note 46, at 3.
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poverty and income.241Thus far, I have characteri ed theOpportunismZoneprimarily as a tool for developers, landowners, and others who mightbenefit financially from investments. ut this study may also suggest thatelected officials, in certain instances, may also be using the OpportunismZone as a form of political payoff. Specifically, residents and businessowners in counties that received designations were able to avail ofadditional public subsidy.The competition for investors through the Opportunism Zone is suchthat less productive areas of the country are in competition for fundinvestment from the nation’s most productivemetropolitan regions.242 As aresult, simply designating an area as within a one does not guaranteeinvestment. Nonetheless, a designation may send amessage that the area isfavored over others, which can benefit politically those in power.Reports have also documented efforts among special interest groups,such as landowners and developers, to influence Opportunism Zonedesignations.243 One particular neighborhood on the West Side ofManhattan was included in a one even though some market rate rents inthe neighborhood are in excess of $8,000 per month per apartment, andincomes exceeded $112,000 in mean household income in 2017.244Economic development officials in Detroit included areas designated by alocal developer.245TheDepartment of Treasury designated a Nevada censustract based on lobbying from a wealthy landowner.246 Such conduct maybest be solved through disgorgement, which could entail redrawing one
241. d. at 4.242. Cf. Schragger, supra note 33 passim (discussing the issues with interstate andinterlocal competition).243. See Small, supra note 47.244. d.245. See eff Ernsthausen ustin Elliott, How a a Break to Help the PoorWent to
BA wner Dan Gilbert, PROP LICA (Oct. 24, 2019,),https: www.propublica.org article how-a-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-nba-owner-dan-gilbert https: perma.cc 6C4D-5 Z ( uicken’stop lobbyist was so enmeshed in the process, his name appears on anopportunity one map made by the city economic development organi ation,recommending part of downtown be included in the tax break. No other non-city officials are named on the document. ).246. See Lipton Drucker, supra note 87.
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boundaries.247 In any case, the tool needs reform so that investors have theburden of proving that funds are flowing to benefit the public.2. Lack of Annual Reporting RequirementApart from designation, the most significant area of concern withrespect to transparency is the lack of an annual reporting requirement forualified Opportunity Zone funds and fund investors.248 At present, thereare no reporting requirements.249 y comparison, the New Markets TaxCredit Coalition reports annually on the use of the New Markets TaxCredit.250 The Coalition also advocates for continued funding of the NewMarkets Tax Credit.251 The Coalition’s annual report may appear self-serving, but it can also demonstrate strengths and weaknesses of the NewMarkets Tax Credit. That information can serve as the basis of regulatoryreform. A significant criticism of the Community Development lock Grantis its lack of reporting and demonstrating success.252 The NewMarkets TaxCredit Coalition Report, and lack of a unified Community Development
247. For a recent discussion of restitutionary disgorgement of improper gains, seeCaprice L. Roberts, Dis or in Emoluments, 103 MAR ETTE L. REV. 1 passim(2019).248. See, e. ., Noah uhayar, rump a Break s Hidden Fren y Corporate Giants
Are Rushin n, LOOM ERG (Dec. 12, 2019),https: www.bloombergquint.com business filing-fren y-shows-companies-lining-up-for-poor-area-tax-breaks https: perma.cc F3C -P 9A ( The filings underscore the lack of transparency surrounding afederal subsidy that could cost billions of dollars . . . . )249. See I.R.C. 1400Z-1-2 (2018). For a discussion of how existing place-basedeconomic development strategies include reporting requirements, see rettTheodos rady Meixell, rb. Inst., Public Comment on ReportingRequirements in Proposed Opportunity Zone Regulations 3-4 (Dec. 28, 2018),https: www.urban.org sites default files publication 99621public comment on reporting requirements in proposed o regulations.pdf https: perma.cc F 4 -RZDZ .250. See, e. ., NEW MAR ETS TA CREDIT COAL., NEW MAR ETS TA CREDIT PROGRESSREPORT: 2019 ( uly 2019), https: nmtccoalition.org wp-contentuploads 2019 09 2019-NMTC-Progress-Report.pdfhttps: perma.cc AC39- 4V8 .251. d. at 2.252. See Theodos et al., supra note 81, at 13.
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lock Grant report, point to the need for Opportunity Zone transparencyand reporting.
C. ParticipationParticipation is the third and final lens through which this articleanaly es the Opportunism Zone. The only participation required in thegovernance of theOpportunismZone is in tasking the governor of each statewith designating each one (or to delegate that task).253 The focus in thisSection’s participation-prong analysis is on the significant cost ofparticipating in an Opportunism Zone investment.1. Costs of Participating in an Opportunism Zone InvestmentThe requirements for participating in the Opportunism Zone aresignificant. On the investment side, there are burdensome requirements toboth organi e and invest in a ualified Opportunity Zone Fund. There arealso significant professional costs to developing a pro ect that might seekfinancing from a ualified Opportunity Zone Fund. As a recent report fromthe rban Institute notes, it is very unlikely that Opportunity Zone residentswill have the ability to invest in pro ects that will likely shape theirneighborhoods.254First, it is important to note the significant compliance costs associatedwith entry. The actual text of the Investing in Opportunity Act is under threethousand words.255 Yet the final regulations on investing in ualifiedOpportunity Funds issued by the .S. Treasury Department and the InternalRevenue Service total some 544 pages.256 While the design of the Investingin Opportunity Act may not have intended to be burdensome onparticipants, the resulting regulations are incredibly complex. As a result,simply complyingwith the regulations of theOpportunismZone tool createssignificant barriers to individuals and groups participating in one
253. 26 .S.C. 1400Z-1(b)(1).254. See Theodos et al., supra note 186, at 13 (discussing the misalignment ofinvestors with capital gains to invest and the modest incomes of residents ofOpportunity Zones).255. The final statute adopted was even more brief. See 1400Z-1-2.256. Investing in ualified Opportunity Funds, Treas. Reg. 1.1400Z2(a)-1 to (d)-2, 1.1400Z2(f)-1, 1.1502-14Z, 1.1504-3 (2019).
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investments.257 Complying with the requirements will no doubt requiresignificant expenses including professional tax, financial, and legalassistance all professional service providers who stand to profit from theexpense of compliance.258Second, the high barriers of entry to investing in a ualifiedOpportunityZone Fund reinforces the tool’s prioriti ation of wealthy outsiders overcommunity insiders. For starters, an investor must have capital gains fromthe sale of assets, such as stocks or real estate, with which to invest in aualified Opportunity Zone Fund.259 Reports indicate that capital gains gooverwhelmingly to already well-off families.260 The ma ority of taxpayersare therefore unlikely and, in most cases, unable to even participate inorgani ing and investing in a ualified Opportunity Zone Fund.261 Thus, thewealthy rather than the everyday resident of Opportunity Zone tractsare in a prime position to organi e or invest in a ualified Opportunity ZoneFund.Third, there is a stickiness about investing in a ualified OpportunityZone Fund beyond the fact that the ability to participate is contingent oncapital gains reali ation. Fund organi ers often require large minimuminvestments due to the hassle involved in organi ing and operating funds.
257. See, e. ., on anister Matthew Rothstein, he Real pportunity one Gold
Rush s Happenin at Events, in Consultants ffices, ISNOW (Aug. 5, 2019),https: www.bisnow.com national news opportunity- ones inside-the-industry-forming-around-the-opportunity- one-program-100192https: perma.cc F339-269L (describing how the need for expensiveprofessional services could keep small community-based groups fromparticipating).258. d. ( Opportunity ones will likely prove to be a windfall for law andaccounting firms advising investors . . . . ).259. See 1400Z-2.260. See, e. ., Distribution of Lon erm Capital Gains and ualified
Dividends by E panded Cash ncome Percentile, , TA POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 16,2018), https: www.taxpolicycenter.org model-estimates distribution-individual-income-tax-long-term-capital-gains-and-qualified-30https: perma.cc 6YS -E5Z3 (noting that the top 1 of families earnedalmost 70 of capital gains in 2018).261. It may be immaterial that participation in organi ing and investing inualified Opportunity Zone Funds is limited to the already wealthy. If the goalof the Opportunity Zone is to direct capital to areas where it is lacking, thesource of the funds may not make a difference. However, from a normativedesign perspective, limiting participation to only those with existing wealthmay limit the types of pro ects that are selected and invested in.
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One report indicates that most funds come with a six-figure minimuminvestment amount.262 As a result, most individual taxpayers, even if theyhad capital gains to invest, would be shut out of any possible gains frominvesting due to the amount of funds required to invest.263There is still another hurdle: cash invested in a ualified OpportunityZone must remain for a certain period of time in order to maximi e taxincentives.264 Fund organi ers must clearly articulate how assets will beinvested in pro ects.265 As with other sorts of financial investments,investors must be comfortable leaving their assets invested in a fundwithout the certainty that they will even be able to recoup their investmentshould pro ects not produce returns.Not only does the complexity and risk associated with organi ing andinvesting in ualified Opportunity Zone Funds lock many communitymembers out of the process, but it also further exacerbates the propensityfor conservative, less risky investing. In order to take advantage of both thecapital gains deferral, and the stepped-up basis components of theOpportunity Zone, ualified Opportunity Zone Funds are unlikely to investin pro ects that are either risky or unlikely to increase in value. Smallbusinesses are less likely to receive investor attention given the emphasison real estate from the investment community.266As a result, pro ects with more fixed return, such as market ratehousing, as well as hotels and other commercial real estate pro ects servingparticular segments of the population (i.e. tourists, visitors,businesspeople) aremore likely to receive funds. Investment in ob creation
262. Ryan Ermey, pportunity one nvestin s t for You , IPLINGER ( une 5,2019), https: www.kiplinger.com article investing T041-C000-S002-opportunity- one-investing-is-it-for-you.html https: perma.cc 53C-5R23 .263. This aspect of the story is really about economies of scale. To set up a ualifiedOpportunity Zone fund, one must pay professionals like accountants, lawyers,and other specialists. Complying with program requirements is expensive. Itis less profitable to allow more taxpayers to oin a fund than it is to set highminimum investment amounts and focus on fewer investors.264. See 1400Z-2(b) (determining tax basis in opportunity one property afterfive, seven, or ten years).265. This Article acknowledges disclosure requirements associated withorgani ing and investing in a ualified Opportunity Zone Fund, while notingthat they are beyond the scope of the present argument.266. See Theodos et al., supra note 186, at 22-23.
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and business growth in particular could do much to benefit residents whohave lived and worked in a one for years.2672. roader Implications of ParticipationProfessors ocelyn Simonson and Sabeel Rahman have explored thevarious ways that popular participation shapes important governmentfunctions such as administration of the criminal ustice system and indeveloping responses to inequality in economic systems.268 This combinedwork builds on arguments advanced by Simonson and Rahman elsewhere.For Simonson, bottom up participation of the people through courtwatching, participatory defense, and community bail funds shapes bothcriminal procedure and constitutional norms.269 For Rahman, how wegovern access to essential necessities, like water and housing, should beviewed through inequality and exclusionary administration.270I have made the connection between participation and connectioncommunity-based economic development elsewhere.271With respect to theOpportunism Zone, participation matters in many of the same ways thatplace matters. If the purpose behind the tool is to provide local residentswith greater capital access, it would stand to reason that involving residentsin the decisions driving capital influx ought to improve outcomes.This is no doubt easier said than it is done. Legislative attempts to makedevelopment more palatable face significant opposition.272 The theory that
267. See, e. ., Andrew Dunn, pportunity ones Are Creatin pportunity For
Charlotte s Rich, CHARLOTTE AGENDA ( an. 14, 2019),https: www.charlotteagenda.com 153652 opportunity- ones-charlottehttps: perma.cc D2R-5V M .268. See . Sabeel Rahman ocelyn Simonson, he nstitutional Desi n of
Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679 passim (2020).269. See ocelyn Simonson, he Place of he People in Criminal Procedure, 119COL M. L. REV. 249 (2019).270. See . Sabeel Rahman, Constructin Citi enship E clusion and nclusion
hrou h the Governance of Basic ecessities, 118 COL M. L. REV. 2447 (2018).271. Edward W. De arbieri, State and Local Economic Development and rban
Anticipatory Governance, 43 PLANNING ZONING L. REP. 1 passim (2020).272. Recently, a bill in the California State Senate that would have eliminatedcertain oning restrictions near transit lines and ob centers was defeated.Scott rinklow, California s ransit Housin Bill SB Stuck in Limbo ntil, C R ED S.F. (May 16, 2019), https: sf.curbed.com 2019
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resident homeowners will vote their economic interest and encouragetheir elected officials to do the same is not new,273 but it should not deterthe push for greater participation. In recent years, for instance, efforts toexpand participation in commercial real estate investing throughcooperative ownership have emerged.274 When the law excludesparticipation, it impedes the benefits that flow from the checks and balancesof governance.III. POTENTIALOPPORT NITY ZONE FI ESThe se-Transparency-Participation framework not only helpshighlight the shortcomings of the Opportunity Zones law, but it also offers aroadmap for potential design fixes. This Part provides an overview of thosereforms by building off legislative fixes that have already been proposed. Ifimplemented, this package of reforms could transform Opportunism Zonesand ensure that the program is a tool of empowerment for the individualswithin the targeted communities, rather than amere device for rent-seekingby outsiders.
A. seIn Part II, this Article discussed two primary problems with respect touse. First, under the current law, ualified Opportunity Zone Fundinvestments need not be limited to any particular pro ect-type. Second, bymaximi ing exchange value, the Opportunism Zone largely ignores the use
5 16 18617019 transit-housing-bill-sb-50-approproations-committee-suspense-wiener https: perma.cc A9R -NR9V .273. Here, William Fischel’s notion that local governments act in the interest ofcurrent resident homevoters to the exclusion of others, such as owners ofnewly built homes, renters, and apartment dwellers, is informative. SeeWILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VAL ES INFL ENCELOCAL GOVERNMENT TA ATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND- SE POLICIES 9-10(2001). Homevoter preferences will impact the places where developmentoccurs in a number of ways. It will prevent the deregulation of local oningordinances. d. at 54-57. It will prevent certain economic developmentpro ects. d. at 8-10.274. See, e. ., About YC RE C, N.Y. CITY REAL ESTATE INV. COOPERATIVE,http: nycreic.com about https: perma.cc 7SR-MWW2 ur Story,NORTHEAST INV. COOPERATIVE, http: www.neic.coop our-storyhttps: perma.cc 9 E -4S7E .
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value that residents receive from particular aspects of neighborhood life.Failing to restrict pro ect type, or to consider use value, means thatOpportunity Zone investments need not necessarily contain a public benefitother than the mere investment of capital itself. Capital alone, however, isinsufficient to ensure a public benefit. An investment that improves a pieceof real estate, or supports a new or operating business, does not necessarilyimprove the lives of a designated neighborhood’s existing residents. As thisArticle has argued, focusing on development that improves the lives ofexisting residents ought to be a primary purpose of a community economicdevelopment strategy.With respect to addressing these two use problems, there are a numberof legislative solutions. First, more stringent restrictions could be placed onthe uses of ualified Opportunity Zone Fund investments. Second, userestrictions can focus on particular pro ects that bring the greatest usevalues to existing neighborhood residents. Finally, place-based and people-based strategies might be combined to give choice regarding use of funds topeople who need assistance in the form of expanded cash transfers.Currently, a pair of bills introduced in the House and Senate wouldbegin the process of limiting the uses within Opportunity Zones. TheOpportunity Zone Reporting and Reform Act, introduced by Senator RonWyden, would eliminate the use of Opportunity Zone incentives for self-storage facilities, sports stadiums, and any housing that does not include50 rent-restricted by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and occupiedby individuals earning less than 50 of area median income.275 In theHouse, a bill introduced in theMa orityWhip ames Clyburnwould build onthe Wyden proposal but add parking as a prohibited use for OpportunityZone investments.276 While these proposals would be a step in the rightdirection, neither is perfect when viewed through the se-Transparency-Participation Framework.1. Restrict ses of ualified Opportunity Zone Fund InvestmentsAs mentioned above, there are virtually no restricted uses for ualifiedOpportunity Zone Funds as they exist now.277 Aligning use restrictions on
275. Opportunity Zone Reporting and Reform Act, S. 2787, 116th Cong.6(c)(1)( ) (2019).276. Opportunity Zone Reform Act, H.R. 5042, 116th Cong. 5(c)(1) (2019).277. Other than the prohibited business excluded in Internal Revenue Code Section144(c)(6)( ), the potential use of Opportunity Zone funds is extremely broad.
See I.R.C. 1400Z-2(d)(3) (2018).
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particular policy outcomes may increase public benefits in designatedneighborhoods. These restrictions could be implemented in a variety ofways, and there are a number of place-based economic developmentstrategies to consider as guides in this analysis.For instance, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit represents the mostextreme limitation on use, as the tax credit is only available for the creationof affordable housing. In critiquing the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit,particularly for not delivering affordable housing where it is needed,scholars also note the virtues of the tool in creating affordable housing.278y contrast, the New Markets Tax Credit takes a laxer approach to userestriction by allowing pro ects to contain a variety of uses. In 2018, forinstance, New Markets Tax Credit pro ects included approximately 37 ofpro ects with a retail component, such as mixed-use pro ects, retail,restaurants, and miscellaneous small business and office space.279 Whilethis program design may not be as tailored as the Low-Income Housing TaxCredit, it still allows for evaluation of the incentive by classifying pro ects byuse and location.y restricting real estate development to only affordable housing, thelegislative proposals discussed above steer more towards the narrow Low-Income Housing Tax Credit approach than the broader New Markets TaxCredit approach. In the end, such a narrow focus may be overly restrictive.While such a proposal is no doubt a net positive because it brings to the forehow pro ects will impact neighborhoods and their existing residents, theproposal could be improved upon by thinking more holistically about usevalue. 2. Consider se Value When Restricting ses of ualifiedOpportunity Zone Fund InvestmentsAccess to employment opportunities, health care, and education are allkey assets to building stable neighborhoods and serving marginali ed
278. SeeWeiss, supra note 142 passim.279. Mixed-use pro ects, grocery stores, recreation, retail, restaurants, and servicesector, hotels and tourism, and miscellaneous small business and office spaceNewMarkets Tax Credit pro ects in 2018 totaled 106 pro ects. Divided by thetotal number of New Markets Tax Credit Pro ects in 2018 of 286, theserepresent approximately 37 of all pro ects. NEW MAR ETS TA CREDIT COAL.,
supra note 250, at 16.
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populations.280 As such, affordable housing, health clinics or medicalfacilities, and other pro ects that locate affordable housing near centers ofemployment, health care, and education have particularly high use value tolow-income residents.Other place-based economic development incentives includeopportunities to consider use value. Community Development Entities,certified by the Treasury’s Community Development Financial InstitutionsFund, must have as their missions the primary purpose of serving low-income individuals.281 Such entities, in selecting a particular pro ect toapprove and finance in the process of a NewMarkets Tax Credit transactionmust consider factors such as how the pro ect will improve current residentquality of life in other words, use value.282 State housing agencies mayconsider proximity to grocery stores, transportation, and other amenities indeciding to which pro ects and developers to extend Low-Income HousingTax Credits.283 Local government agencies can consider particular pro ectfeatures which may fall under one of the six use value categories whenconsidering Community Development lock Grant awards.284 Currently, nosimilar moments or processes exist to formali e consideration of use valuein Opportunity Zone investments. Any use value considerations are left toprivate investors who, as already discussed, tend to narrowly focus onexchange value.285 Given the incentives to maximi e profits of theOpportunity Zone, health care and related facilities are unlikely to receiveinvestments.286
280. See, e. ., Caitlin M. Stover, Margaret . Drew ason Potter urd, Services and
Resources for People Livin with H A DS in the Southcoast of Massachusetts
Can t Get here From Here , 2 . N RSING HEALTHCARE 1, 3 (2017)(identifying transportation as a ma or barrier in the inability of vulnerablegroups in accessing health care).281. See 26 .S.C. 45D(c) (2018).282. See Pappas, supra note 130, at 325-28.283. SeeWeiss, supra note 143, at 233 ( Market analysts are instructed to analy ea wide variety of factors in the primarymarket area’ . . . including . . . location,employment and local economy, area demographics . . . . ).284. See 42 .S.C. 5301(c) (2018) Theodos et al., supra note 81, at 7-8.285. See Zhang, supra note 191, at 1588-89.286. Here, there is a clear contrast between the Opportunity Zone as currently inforce and the New Markets Tax Credit New Markets Tax Credit pro ects aretax-exempt, often mission-based Community Development Entities whichthemselves benefit from financing provided by Treasury’s CDFI Fund. See
supra, Section II.C.2.a.
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Some of the currently proposed legislative fixes, such as eliminatingparticularly undesirable uses like storage facilities, sports stadiums, andparking lots, address use value concerns. These facilities are, in many cases,designed to benefit transient or out-of-town populations, often to thedetriment of existing neighborhood residents. Sport stadiums, whichalready receivemassive public subsidy, have recently come under scholarlyfocus as they tend to offer little value to insiders.287 Imposing suchrestrictions aims to increase use value for existing residents. However,rather than a purely negative approach that eliminates certain categories ofinvestment, Opportunity Zones would stand to benefit from a positiveapproach that more fully integrates use considerations into every decisionto extend subsidies.3. Combine Place- ased and People- ased SubsidiesOne legislative proposal for reformmight include both place-based andpeople-based subsidies. For example, the Earned Income Tax Creditprovides a wage subsidy for poor workers.288 Reshaping the OpportunityZone to give a percentage boost to the Earned Income Tax Credit forresidents of Opportunity Zones, in addition to the capital gains taxexpenditures of the existing law, might address some of the distributionalissues revealed through the se frame.While not tied to the Opportunity Zone, Senator Eli abeth Warren’sAmerican Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2019 offers similarelements of place-based and people-based reform.289 Such a bill, whichprovides a benefit for existing residents who have lived in a neighborhoodfor at least four years, demonstrates the challenges inherent in benefitingexisting residents, since gentrifying residents could benefit alongsidelonger-term residents.290 Nevertheless, creating some ability for existing
287. See, e. ., Matthew . Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities Are hey
Economically Justifiable A Case Study of the Los An eles Staples Center, 10 .MIAMI S. L. REV. 483, 509-23 (2002).288. See MICHELLE LYON DR M L, TA CREDITS FOR THE WOR ING POOR: A CALL FORREFORM 2-3 (2019).289. S. 787, 116th Cong. 201 (2019) (providing down payment assistance forAfrican American and othermarginali ed groups seeking to purchase homes).290. See riston Capps, Eli abeth Warren s Housin Crisis Plan Hints at
Reparations, LOOM ERG CITYLA ( an. 4, 2019),https: www.bloomberg.com news articles 2019-01-04 inside-senator-eli abeth-warren-s-housing-crisis-fix https: perma.cc G3VP-H2ER .
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residents to decide how to make use of public resources designed toimprove their lives is an important direction for place-based economicstrategies to head.4. Against se RequirementsAn obvious argument against regulating use and including factorsassociated with use value is that increased regulation does not always leadto better outcomes. For instance, there is evidence to support the assertionthat decreasing land use regulation can result in a decrease in housingprices.291 If a goal of economic development tools like Opportunity Zones isto address issues of affordable housing, perhaps we should considerderegulatory efforts too. To see how this could work in practice, considerthe case of deregulation of craft beverage laws. A study of Charlotte, NorthCarolina, indicated that proximity of housing to new craft breweriesresulted in an increase in property values, with an almost 10 increase inthe average cost of single-family homes and a 3 increase in the value ofcondominiums.292 However, the study is silent with respect to change inrents or impact on rental housing prices.293In the conversation about use, it is important to discuss how regulationson use can lead to exclusion. For instance, scholars have critiqued urbanpolicy in the nited States focused on building power and autonomy in thesuburbs, a use value increase for suburban residents, to the exclusion ofresidents of the urban core.294 There is a recognition and concern that pastinequities under law, such as those perpetuated by redlining and other
291. Desen Lin Susan Wachter, he Effect of Land se Re ulation on Housin
Prices heory and Evidence from California (Samuel Zell Robert Lurie RealEstate Ctr., niv. of Penn., Working Paper No. 817, 2019)http: realestate.wharton.upenn.edu wp-content uploads2019 04 LinWachter19 04042019.pdf https: perma.cc MN7G-W ME .292. David Hopper Neil Reid, niversity of oledo Craft Breweries ncrease
Residential Property alues, ACAD. MIN TE (Sept. 26, 2019)https: academicminute.org 2019 09 neil-reid-university-of-toledo-craft-breweries-increase-residential-property-values https: perma.cc 85GL-M8L4 .293. Deregulatory efforts that disproportionally benefit homeowners can be seenas subsidi ing homeownership.294. See, e. ., erry Frug, he Geo raphy of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1068-81 (1996).
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racially discriminatory laws, not be repeated.295 Even well-intentioned, orwell-designed tools, over time can be less useful. For instance, programs likethe Community Development Financial Institution Fund of the .S. Treasurymay take on more conservative, less favorable policies due to theinstitutional needs of the organi ations themselves.296A theoretical counter to arguments against use may be that use and usevalue is a better mechanism to address human flourishing. Gregory S.Alexander has articulated property-based theories that support humanflourishing.297 Alexander’s notion of private ownership is ustified on thebasis that ownership facilitates the opportunity for people to live well-lived lives. 298 The theoretical basis of the Opportunity Zone seemsinconsistent with Alexander’s notion of human flourishing because of theabsence of a prioriti ation of use. The Opportunity Zone is supposed todirect capital to capital starved areas, but without any use-specificity. Ifcapital does not contribute to uses that improve the lives of those living indesignated ones, then the tool ought to be revised and reconsidered. Andfor the reasons discussed above, use restrictions would help guarantee thatOpportunity Zones provide actual benefits to low-income communities andnot only to rent-seeking outsiders.
B. ransparencyThere are two key problems with respect to transparency as it appliesto improving the Opportunism Zone. First, the tool lacks a periodicreporting requirement. Second, the process for one designation in thestates and territories is opaque, and this opacity has sometimes led toallegations of landowners directly lobbying for census tract designation.Promising legislative reforms in Congress to address transparency in the
295. See Andre M. Perry David Harshbarger, America s Formerly Redlined
ei hborhoods Have Chan ed, So Must Solutions to Rectify hem, ROO INGS(Oct. 14, 2019), https: www.brookings.edu research americas-formerly-redlines-areas-changed-so-must-solutions https: perma.cc F7N9-73FD .296. SeeMiriam Axel-Lute, s Success Makin CDF s oo Risk Averse , SHELTERFORCE(Aug. 29, 2019), https: shelterforce.org 2019 08 29 is-success-making-cdfis-too-risk-averse https: perma.cc Y8NN-2RDY (examining whethercommunity development financial institutions are taking on enough risk infurtherance of their missions to serve undercapitali ed entrepreneurs whotraditional lenders will not lend to).297. GREGORY S. ALE ANDER, PROPERTY ANDH MAN FLO RISHING (2018).298. d. at xiii.
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Opportunity Zone include both an annual reporting requirement, as well asdisclosure concerning particular tracts that ought not have beendesignated.1. Annual Reporting RequirementsTransparency in the form of required reporting is perhaps the mostintuitive aspect of the se-Transparency-Participation frame. For such atechnical tool a tax incentive to defer capital gains data about outcomesand benefits to the public can seem removed and abstract. ut data will becritical in assessing whether Opportunity Zones in fact benefit residents ofthe community, while avoiding relegation as mere Opportunism Zones.Indeed, the original draft of the Investing in Opportunity Act required aprogress report five years after the bill was adopted and annuallythereafter.299 nfortunately, the reporting requirementwas removed in thelanguage ultimately passed into law.300Today, the call for increased transparency and reporting requirementsgarners bipartisan support. One Senate proposal, introduced by RepublicanSenator and Opportunity Zone proponent Tim Scott, includes reportingrequirements in the form of an annual report by the Treasury about theimpact of the tool.301 Such a requirement falls short of guaranteeing publicdisclosure of pro ect-level data. It also fails to guarantee that third-party,nonpartisan researchers can analy e the data and study Opportunity Zoneoutcomes on communities. Meanwhile, ma or Democratic-led legislativereform proposals in the House and Senate agree about the need fortransparency in theOpportunity Zone. The proposals introduced by SenatorWyden302 and Ma ority Whip Clyburn303 would require the GovernmentAccountability Office to issue a report every five years on the communityimpact of the Opportunity Zone on designated and non-designated censustracts.
299. See Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 293, 115th Cong. 2(c) (2017).300. I.R.C. 1400Z-1-2 (2018).301. S. 2994, 116th Cong. sec. 3, 6039 (2019).302. See S. 2787, 116th Cong. 8 (2019).303. See H.R. 5042, 116th Cong. 7 (2019).
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2. Opportunity Zone DesignationIn addition to annual reporting requirements, it is also essential thatthere be more transparency in the Opportunity Zone designation process.As discussed above, a number of state Opportunity Zone designationprocesses revealed significant lobbying from investors.304 Setting asideinstances where lobbyists and developers sought to influence the TrumpAdministration’s Treasury Department certification of OpportunityZones,305 there are reasons for local elected officials to make particularOpportunity Zone designations as well. If local elected officials knew thatparticular investors owned property, officials could include those parcels indesignated Opportunity Zones to offer an additional incentive for thatdevelopment to occur.306 Local elected officials, very sensitive to increasinglocal property tax revenue,were in a position to use the federal OpportunityZone designation process in a way that increased or attempted to increaseproperty tax revenue and expand growth.307However, there is absolutely no reason why Congress should add anadditional federal subsidy to commercial real estate development in an areaalready attracting, or likely to attract, capital. And Congress certainly shouldnot be designating Opportunity Zones without a transparent and openprocess sub ect to public scrutiny. If the Opportunity Zone is to survive, thedesignated census tracts should absolutely be in bona fide distressed areasnot already attracting capital.308 For landowners to reap an outsi ed benefit
304. See supra Section II. .305. See, e. ., Ernsthausen Elliott, supra note 245.306. Internal Revenue Code Section 1400Z-1(b)(1) authori es state governors (orchief executive in territories) to designate Opportunity Zones. It was notuncommon for governors to tap local economic development officials todesignate particular census tracts. See Ernsthausen Elliott, supra note 245( O fficials in cities like Detroit would have a lot of sway in the Michigandesignation process. A week later, a top economic development official inDetroit emailed maps of areas that the city wanted to nominate for theprogram to state officials. )307. In this way, the Opportunity Zone is yet another instance of Molotch’s notionof the city as growth machine. SeeMolotch, supra note 43.308. Observers have pointed out some state examples, such as Wisconsin, whereno Opportunity Zone designation occurred in non-low-income contiguoustracts. See, e. ., @NateM ensen, TWITTER (Dec. 3, 2019, 11:56 AM)https: twitter.com NateM ensen status 1201908081757769729
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because they were able to influence the designation process is wrong, andit points towards the worst aspect of the Opportunism Zone.The experience of Portland, Oregon is once again instructive. InPortland, fear of gentrification led to no distressed neighborhoods beingdesignated.309 Instead, the entire central downtown business area wasdesignated.310 However, the revelation that only the downtown Portlandarea was designated led some to question the goals of the Opportunity Zoneincentive in funding capital investment in an area already attractingcapital.311A fair designation process giving eligible tracts the possibility fordesignation based on ob ective criteria should be the standard. Mechanismsto reveal designation processes, and to redo improper designations, areimportant to ensuring equitable distribution of public benefits arising fromOpportunity Zone designation.nfortunately, the current legislative proposals to address thedesignation process are insufficient. oth the Clyburn andWyden proposalswould merely eliminate designated census tracts that are contiguous tolow-income communities. The Scott proposal, meanwhile, would leave thedesignations alone. The proposal introduced by Representative RashidaTlaib, whose district includes the city of Detroit, would repeal the
https: perma.cc 9 5-SRFW (citing pportunity ones in Wisconsin,OPPORT NITY D , https: opportunitydb.com location wisconsinhttps: perma.cc M 96-Z9FV ).309. SeeMelody Carter, Federal pportunity ones he ewest Gentrification ool27, (Ga. Tech Schl. of City Regional Planning Applied Research Paper 2019),https: smartech.gatech.edu handle 1853 61326 https: perma.cc L9YR-8Y3 (citing an interview with Troels Adrian of Prosper Portland on Feb. 5,2019). Although place-based tax incentives come in a variety of forms, theytend to result in gentrification. See Layser, supra note 89 passim Eric Willettrett Dunlavey, Buildin pportunity Mappin Gentrification and
nvestment across pportunity ones, RCLCO 2-4 ( an. 29, 2019),https: www.rclco.com wp-content uploads 2019 02 Advisory-Opportunity-Zones-Gentrification-Investment.pdf https: perma.cc Z5WA-2 HC .310. See pportunity ones in re on, OPPORT NITY D ,https: opportunitydb.com location oregon https: perma.cc M 96-Z9FV .311. See Noah uhayar Lauren Leatherby, Welcome to a Breaklandia,LOOM ERG SINESSWEE , https: www.bloomberg.com graphics 2019-portland-opportunity- ones https: perma.cc T8H -2W V .
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Opportunity Zone, thus undoing the designations entirely.312 To truly solvethe designation problem,weneed not only limitations onwhat communitiescan be designated Opportunity Zones but also greater community voice inthat designation process.3. Against Transparency RequirementsRobust transparency and reporting requirements were included in theinitial Investing in Opportunity Act.313 Statements from Opportunity Zoneproponents indicate that the transparency and reporting provisions wereremoved from the 2017 tax overhaul because of proceduralconsiderations.314Today, however, proposals in Congress fromOpportunityZone supporters include transparency and reporting requirements.315Excessive disclosure in the form of burdensome documents or formsmight cause time delay and slow deal flow. However, such transparencyefforts could ensure that the deals made are actually benefitting thecommunity and not simply outside investors. Thus, a transparency focuscould address the disconnect between Opportunity Zones, a tool to expandthe hori ons of those living in poor communities, and Opportunism Zones,playgrounds for rent-seeking by outside investors.Nevertheless, despite the blatant need and bipartisan support forgreater transparency, actually achieving that transparency will not be easy.Measuring success is difficult, especially when the return on investment ishard to quantify. An attempt to define appropriate metrics can be a fraughtendeavor. Choosing priorities among those metrics is not easy. With thatbeing said, legislative proposals such as the IMPACTActwould imposemorereporting requirements than currently exist.316 Those reportingrequirements would focus on the number of full-time equivalent obs
312. H.R. 5252, 116th Cong. 1 (2019).313. S. 293, 115th Cong. 2(c) (2017).314. See, e. ., Abby Shult , Private Sector Looks to Measure mpact of pportunity
ones, ARRON’S (Feb. 27, 2019) https: www.barrons.com articles private-sector-looks-to-measure-impact-of-opportunity- ones-01551278200https: perma.cc L4-5N 8 ( It was deemed those reportingrequirements were not relevant it wasn’t a political or substantive decision,it was a procedural decision . . . . ).315. See, e. ., S. 2994, 116th Cong. sec. 3, 6039 (2019).316. d.
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resulting from Opportunity Zone investments, as well as the amount offunds invested in the designated ones.317
C. ParticipationAt present, the Opportunity Zone lacks any requirement for public orgovernmental participation in the investment selection and approvalprocess. Potential legislative solutions to address this participation gapinclude involving Community Development Entities and involving localgovernment bodies, among other proposals.1. Involve Community Development EntitiesOne avenue for stimulating public participation, or at least attaining aproxy for such participation, is to require the involvement of an alreadyhighly regulated entity, such as a Treasury-certified CommunityDevelopment Entity.318 Community Development Entities are defined asentities whose primarymission is to serve or provide investment capital forlow-income communities and individuals, and they are accountable to thosegroups through governance mechanisms.319 Issuing tax credits through aCommunity Development Entity is the vehicle used by the NewMarkets TaxCredit.320 If the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Code have an existingdefinition and certification process for mission-based groups serving low-income communities and individuals, it is logical to involve those samegroups in the Opportunity Zone tool.There is some evidence that such involvement is beginning to takeshape. Community Development Entities and Community DevelopmentFinancial Institutions (CDFIs), another certification offered by Treasury,have announced developments with ualified Opportunity Zone Funds.321Recently, Clearinghouse CDFI announced a 31-unit multi-family housingdevelopment in the oreatown neighborhood of Los Angeles.322 National
317. d.318. I.R.C. 45D(c) (2018).319. d. 45D(c)(1)(A)-(C).320. d. 45D(c).321. See, e. ., Clearin house CDF Closes First pportunity one Development,CLEARINGHO SE CDFI (Dec. 5, 2019), https: www.clearinghousecdfi.comccdfi-closes-first-opp- one-development https: perma.cc ATV4-DYS .322. d.
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nonprofits with affiliated Community Development Financial Institutions,such as Enterprise Community Partners and Local Initiatives SupportCorporation, also have provided resources for investors and localgovernment officials to use the Opportunity Zone.323Involving mission-based groups that have a focus on low-incomecommunities facilitates consideration of the impact of potentialinvestments on existing residents in Opportunity Zone tracts. If low-incomecommunities have a mechanism to participate in the governance of amission-based group, there is the chance to raise local resident concernsthat are not the likely focus of the ualifiedOpportunity Zone Fund investor.Requiring the involvement of a Community Development Entity orCommunity Development Financial Institution would allow for certaintythat funds and pro ects will be focused on low-income communities andindividuals.2. Involve Local Government odiesAnother way to involve a proxy for local participation is to require alocal government agency such as an economic development body beinvolved. The Community Development lock Grant process engages stateand local governments.324 For example, in 2019, the State of ansasannounced $11million in Community Development lock Grant funds to beawarded for community improvement pro ects in 23 communities.325A similar mechanism could add a layer of community representation inOpportunity Zones. States could allocate grants to local communities forparticular pro ects that either nonprofit or for-profit developers haveproposed. Coalitions and partnerships with public support could self-organi e and engage in investing or development. Thus, the six categories
323. See, e. ., pportunity , ENTERPRISE COMM. PARTNERS,https: www.enterprisecommunity.org opportunity360https: perma.cc Z56C-DCP .324. See 42 .S.C. 69 5303 (2018) ( The Secretary of Housing and rbanDevelopment is authori ed to make grants to States, units of general localgovernment, and Indian tribes to carry our activities in accordance with theprovisions of this chapter. ).325. Million in Community Development Block Grants Awarded for Community
mprovement Pro ects, AN. DEP’T COMM. ( an. 24, 2019),https: www.kansascommerce.gov 2019 01 11-million-in-community-development-block-grants-awarded-for-community-improvement-pro ectshttps: perma.cc YZ7-N9M .
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of use value are more likely to be a consideration when evaluating pro ectsif there is a local constituency involved.3. Against Participation RequirementsPerhaps the strongest arguments against increasing participation isefficiency: additional participation can delay pro ects. Therefore, delayespecially from additional participation can be fatal to pro ects movingforward. Participation, or over-participation, can certainly lead tounnecessary delay. However, given the significant flaws in the design of theOpportunity Zone both with respect to one designation, design focus onexchange value, and lack of transparency participation seems a limitedconstraint on an otherwise generous tool. Participation might permit timeto fully explore whether a pro ect is actually in need of an Opportunity Zoneincentive, answering the questionwhether the pro ectwould occur but forthe incentive.326 If a pro ect would occur whether or not the OpportunityZone incentive is claimed, that fact erodes the ustification for the incentivein the first place.CONCL SIONAt a timewhen elected officials are increasingly under political pressureto deliver obs and economic development, all levels of government arepushing for place-based tools to drive growth. The Opportunity Zone is butthe most recent place-based economic development law designed toincrease capital investment in capital-starved communities. Proponents ofOpportunity Zones, on both sides of the political aisle, trumpet the far-reaching potential that the Opportunity Zone professes.However, as this Article has demonstrated, the Opportunity Zone is aradical, dangerous economic development tool that exemplifies the worsttendencies of the trend toward market-based solutions to societalproblems. Where once the federal government led economic developmentefforts through a command and control approach, the federal governmenthas largely taken its hand off the wheel. On its face, the Opportunity Zoneappears to be ust another effort to develop local economies through thesame old approach. The reality, however, is much worse. While manyaspects of the Opportunity Zone are not new, the total lack of userestrictions, absence of transparency, and deficiency of public or
326. See Theodos et al., supra note 186, at 26-31.
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government participation in pro ect selection make likely outcomesfrightening.Fortunately, there are a number of potential fixes to the OpportunityZones design flaws. Some proposals a number of which are pending inCongress focus on factoring in use when examining Opportunity Zoneinvestments, transparency, and reporting. These programs also seek toincrease participation by mission-based organi ations and localgovernment. While lawmakers are still coalescing around a compromiseapproach, these reforms have support from lawmakers of all politicalstripes.Lawmakers who are able to drive place-based economic growth willcontinue to en oy constituent support. ut tax, economic development, andother areas of law should constrain spending efforts that are ineffective,inefficient, and serve to mask unsavory windfalls. Legal tools, such as theOpportunity Zone,must be analy ed and viewed skeptically. Otherwise, anypotential gains are likely to be vastly outweighed by unwise losses, harmingthose who struggle to succeed and improve their lives and the lives of theirchildren and loved ones.

